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1. Introduction
Among the many factors contributing to the financial crisis of 2007–08, the role 
of the growing interconnectedness of the 
global financial system is perhaps the least 
understood. The crisis exposed the fact that 
regulators and market participants had very 
limited information about the network of 
obligations between financial institutions. It 
also revealed that there was little theoretical 
understanding of the relationship between 
interconnectedness and financial stability. 
Since that time there has been an upsurge 
in empirical and theoretical work on these 
issues. The aim of this article is to  survey 
this literature, with the focus on what it tells 
us about the relationship between network 
structure and the vulnerability of the finan-
cial system to contagion.
The key challenges facing this research 
area include the following: What are the rea-
sons for the growing interconnectedness of 
the financial system? Do more connections 
tend to amplify or dampen systemic shocks? 
Does the structure of the network matter? If 
so, what structural features are relevant for 
setting policy? A particularly important ques-
tion is how network structure interacts with 
other potential sources of contagion. In the 
 run-up to the crisis, leverage levels increased 
and capital buffers at some banks were 
extremely thin. Large financial institutions 
had increased their reliance on  short-term 
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funding, which is quickly withdrawn when a 
crisis hits. There was an increasing concen-
tration of assets in a few global  institutions. 
The proliferation of derivatives and secu-
ritization also increased the complexity of 
banks’ balance sheets, thus creating greater 
uncertainty about their financial condition 
during the crisis. 
All of these factors affect the stability of 
the financial system to varying degrees. The 
key issue is how the network of obligations 
relates to other potential sources of con-
tagion, and whether it serves to amplify or 
dampen them. Network connections can 
have a positive effect by diversifying risk 
exposures for individual banks, but they can 
also have a negative effect by creating chan-
nels through which shocks can spread. Much 
of the literature is devoted to examining 
the tension between these two forces. One 
branch focuses on the incentives that banks 
have to form links with one another. These 
include access to investment opportunities, 
risk diversification, liquidity management, 
and the provision of specialized financial 
products. Another branch of the literature 
investigates how shocks are transmitted 
through the web of obligations once they are 
in place. Here, the key issue is the extent to 
which the network contributes to systemic 
risk by amplifying shocks to individual insti-
tutions or assets. The primary focus of this 
article will be on the second branch of the 
literature, although along the way we shall 
also provide pointers to the first.
The question of whether interconnections 
amplify or dissipate shocks depends on many 
factors in addition to the network structure. 
To what extent are banks leveraged? Do 
interbank obligations have priority over obli-
gations to the nonfinancial sector in case of 
default? When a default occurs, what pro-
portion of the nominal obligations are recov-
ered? Another key question is what triggers a 
financial crisis in the first place. Is it a sudden 
demand for liquidity? An  economic shock to 
the value of real assets? A loss of confidence 
in the  creditworthiness of particular institu-
tions? Third, how should one measure the 
“size” of a systemic event? Is it the number of 
banks that default? The shortfall in payments 
from the financial sector to households? The 
loss of bank equity? The overall contraction 
of credit? How do these indicators relate to 
the overall loss of welfare in the economy? 
In what follows, we shall survey a variety of 
models that address these questions.1 Not 
surprisingly, the choice of assumptions leads 
to different conclusions about the impor-
tance of interconnectedness. However we 
also find that there is a common methodology 
underpinning many of these models, includ-
ing the mechanisms that describe how initial 
shocks spread through the network and the 
use of fixed point arguments to describe the 
cumulative effect of these cascading shocks.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In 
section 2, we provide some context by recall-
ing certain key events in the financial crisis 
of 2007–08, as well as the earlier savings and 
loan crisis of the late 1980s. The point of this 
discussion is to emphasize the  multifaceted 
nature of the modern financial network and 
the variety of ways that it can generate con-
tagion in practice. This forms the backdrop 
for our subsequent discussion of the theo-
retical literature. In particular, the failure of 
the insurance giant AIG and the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers highlight two types of net-
work effects that are the main focus of the 
rest of this article: AIG was ostensibly res-
cued to prevent a default cascade, whereas 
Lehman’s failure led to (and was partly 
caused by) a funding run. 
Section 3 lays the groundwork for network 
models of interconnected balance sheets. 
We introduce the basic elements that make 
up the balance sheet of a financial institution, 
1 Other surveys, each with its own focus, include Allen 
and Babus (2009); Summer (2013); Cabrales, Gale, and 
Gottardi (2015); and Hueser (2015).
781Glasserman and Young: Contagion in Financial Networks
including such concepts as assets, liabilities, 
leverage, and net worth. We then consider 
some of the reasons why institutions create 
links with one another, including the man-
agement of liquidity and the diversification 
of risk. We illustrate the complexities that 
result from these interconnections by con-
sidering a hypothetical example, and trace 
how a shock that originates at one institu-
tion can spread through the entire network. 
The same framework can sometimes be 
used to model default cascades that result 
from actual shortfalls in payments, and also 
to model funding runs that are triggered by 
liquidity shocks or crises of confidence but 
not necessarily by outright defaults.
Section 4 considers network models of 
liquidity shocks. We begin by discussing 
the influential framework of Allen and Gale 
(2000) and related models. This line of 
research treats the formation of links in some 
detail, then examines the relative vulnera-
bility of simple, stylized network structures 
such as a completely connected network and 
a ring. We then consider a different approach 
that is exemplified by the framework of Gai, 
Haldane, and Kapadia (2011). This strand of 
the literature investigates the transmission of 
liquidity shocks in a richer variety of network 
structures, seeking to go beyond qualitative 
insights to provide quantitative comparisons 
through numerical simulations. The focus is 
on the  trade-off mentioned earlier between 
the stabilizing effect of interconnections due 
to diversification, and the amplifying effect 
that may result from additional channels 
through which shocks can spread.
We turn in section 5 to a discussion of cas-
cading defaults, building on the pioneering 
model of Eisenberg and Noe (2001) and its 
extensions. The  Eisenberg–Noe framework 
describes how payment shortfalls that orig-
inate at one or more nodes spread through 
the network, causing a widening series of 
defaults. The original model treats all pay-
ment obligations as if they had equal priority; 
it also omits bankruptcy costs, which can sig-
nificantly amplify the impact of a default. We 
consider extensions of the basic framework 
that accommodate these and other features 
of the  real-world financial system. We also 
show how the framework can be adapted 
to model crises of confidence. Under this 
interpretation, a change in market percep-
tions about the  creditworthiness of a given 
institution can have  knock-on effects on the 
 creditworthiness of other institutions, thus 
creating a form of information contagion.
In section 6, we examine the question of 
how to measure the amount of “damage” 
caused by a systemic event. Various mea-
sures have been proposed in the literature: 
the number of banks that fail; the total loss of 
bank capital; the cost of liquidating  long-term 
assets to cover  short-term liabilities; the 
deadweight costs of bankruptcy proceedings, 
and so forth. These modeling choices have 
different implications for the welfare effects 
of financial contagion and hence for setting 
policies that limit the contagiousness of the 
financial system. They also have implications 
for assessing the robustness of financial sys-
tems under the stress tests conducted by 
central banks.
In section 7, we consider various indicators 
of contagiousness and vulnerability that can 
be computed without knowing the details of 
the entire network structure. We show that, 
even with no detailed knowledge of the net-
work structure, one can say quite a lot about 
the inherent contagiousness and vulnerabil-
ity of a node (an individual financial institu-
tion) using  node-level information. These 
indicators include the node’s level of lever-
age, its relative size, its immediate exposure 
to other institutions, and its degree of con-
nectivity with the rest of the financial system. 
In section 8 we consider a model of the 
joint distribution of shocks. Much of the 
financial network literature considers ad hoc 
shocks, like the failure of a specific insti-
tution. Stress testing exercises by central 
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banks typically involve the construction of 
alternative scenarios, rather than a probabil-
ity distribution. Without a full distribution, 
however, it is difficult to assess the inherent 
vulnerability of different network structures 
to financial contagion. Here, we discuss an 
approach suggested by the present authors 
that is both flexible and tractable (Glasserman 
and Young 2015). In particular, we show how 
to bound the expected total loss inflicted by 
simultaneous financial shocks, and how the 
network topology enters into this calculation. 
Surprisingly, one can obtain useful bounds 
without assuming independence among 
shocks, which is an important consideration 
given that banks often hold similar portfo-
lios. A particularly important indicator is the 
“financial connectivity” of the system, which 
determines the extent to which shocks rever-
berate within the system before dissipating.
In section 9, we discuss a variety of net-
work concepts that have been proposed for 
assessing the inherent vulnerability of finan-
cial systems to contagion. One widely studied 
measure is the degree distribution, where the 
degree of a node (e.g., a bank) is the number 
of links that it has with other nodes. To keep 
the analysis tractable, it is usually assumed 
that the nodes are the same in other respects 
such as size, leverage, and asset quality, 
and the object is to study the vulnerability 
of such systems as the degree distribution 
is varied. Another strand of this literature 
focuses on measures of node centrality. Here 
the basic thesis is that more centrally placed 
nodes are potentially the most contagious. 
We discuss alternative notions of centrality 
in the network theory literature, and then 
consider empirical studies that investigate 
the relationship between centrality mea-
sures and the inherent vulnerability of the 
network to contagion. We argue that, thus 
far, the empirical work has not produced a 
compelling link between traditional network 
measures and financial stability; much more 
remains to be done at both a theoretical and 
empirical level to identify the measures that 
are appropriate for predicting contagion in 
actual financial systems.
In section 10, we return to a theme that 
has animated much of the literature, namely, 
the  trade-off between connectivity as a chan-
nel of contagion and connectivity as a means 
of diversifying risk. A common strategy in 
this literature is to investigate the  trade-off 
by varying the average number of links per 
node, while assuming that the nodes are sim-
ilar in other respects. One shortcoming of 
this approach is that it suppresses other fac-
tors, such as heterogeneity in banks’ size and 
leverage, that interact with connectivity in 
complex ways. We argue that one should also 
distinguish between the level of connectivity 
within the financial system (as measured by 
the density of interbank links), and the level of 
connectivity between the financial and non-
financial sectors. The latter is extremely 
important in amplifying (or dissipating) 
shocks to the system, as discussed in section 8.
Section 11 examines contagion through 
common exposures, as opposed to contrac-
tual obligations. When financial firms have 
overlapping asset holdings, a shock to one 
firm can spread to others through a drop in 
the price of common assets, particularly if 
the initial shock leads to a fire sale. Optimal 
portfolio selection diversifies risk for indi-
vidual firms, but can make the system as a 
whole more vulnerable if it leads many firms 
to hold similar portfolios of assets, increas-
ing the likelihood that many firms will be in 
financial distress at the same time. We pro-
vide a brief survey of the literature on these 
issues.
In section 12, we discuss the lack of infor-
mation that bedevils much of the research on 
(and supervision of) financial networks. Even 
regulators who have access to confidential 
information do not have detailed knowledge 
of many parts of the system. There are vari-
ous ways of dealing with this problem. One 
branch of the literature dispenses with any 
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attempt to measure the links directly, and 
instead studies the  co-movements between 
the market values of different financial insti-
tutions using statistical methods. Another 
strand of the literature fills in missing data 
on network connections based on the data 
available. Yet a third way of dealing with lim-
ited information is to formulate measures of 
contagiousness and vulnerability that do not 
rely on detailed knowledge of the network, 
as discussed in section 7. We argue that the 
lack of information is not merely a problem 
for regulators and analysts; it also creates 
uncertainty for market participants that can 
become particularly acute in times of crisis. 
In other words, the opacity of the network 
due to lack of information is itself a contrib-
utor to contagion, and may lead to cascades 
and funding runs that would not occur if 
the network of obligations were known with 
greater certainty.
2. Financial Interconnections and 
Financial Stability in Practice
Let us begin by considering several recent 
episodes that illuminate the role of inter-
connections between financial institutions 
in periods of financial stress. This material 
will provide context and perspective for the 
discussion of theoretical models in subse-
quent sections. A theme of this discussion 
will be the variety of interconnections in the 
events described. In particular, the examples 
illustrate the following phenomena, some-
times operating simultaneously: direct loss 
spillovers through defaults,  mark-to-market 
losses, funding runs, information contagion, 
contagion through correlation, and common 
exposures. The examples also highlight the 
heterogeneity and opacity that characterize 
financial networks.
2.1 AIG and Its Counterparties
Of all the dramatic events of 2008, the one 
that most nearly fits the image of defaults 
cascading through a network is the failure 
of the insurance giant AIG. The company’s 
financial products unit had sold guarantees, 
in the form of credit default swaps, to sev-
eral large banks. The swaps guaranteed pay-
ments from certain pools of assets, including 
subprime mortgages. As market conditions 
deteriorated over the summer of 2008, AIG 
could not meet its payment obligations. The 
government stepped in, providing funds that 
allowed AIG to pay its bank counterparties 
on the swaps, sparing those banks losses that 
might otherwise have continued to spread 
through the financial system. The Financial 
Crisis Inquiry Report concludes, “Without 
the bailout, AIG’s default and collapse could 
have brought down its counterparties, caus-
ing cascading losses and collapses through-
out the financial system” (p. 352). The report 
also makes clear that the Federal Reserve 
and Treasury Department had an incom-
plete picture of AIG’s network of payment 
obligations.
The AIG story illustrates a further point 
to which we return in our discussion of mod-
els: the distinction between realized losses 
and “ mark-to-market” losses. The credit 
default swaps AIG had sold required AIG 
to cover losses on pools of assets in excess 
of a threshold. Losses in a pool exceeding 
the threshold can be seen as analogous to 
a default, against which AIG was provid-
ing protection. In many, if not most cases, 
actual losses did not exceed the required 
threshold so there was no default, and, in a 
narrow sense, no payments were due from 
AIG on its guarantees. However, as the 
condition of the underlying assets deterio-
rated, the value of the guarantees increased 
because it became more likely that they 
would be called upon. AIG’s counterparties 
demanded collateral payments from AIG to 
reflect the increased  mark-to-market value 
of its liabilities. AIG was brought down 
by these collateral calls, and not directly 
by a failure to fulfill its guarantees. (See 
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 chapter 19 of the Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Report for a fuller discussion of these 
events.) The point this illustrates is that 
losses can spread from one node in the 
network (a pool of assets) to another node 
(AIG) through changes in the market value 
of a guarantee, without an actual default.
2.2 The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy
One of the puzzles of September 2008 is 
whether the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers 
precipitated the events that followed it, or 
whether the latter would have occurred any-
way. The most significant direct consequence 
of the Lehman failure was the liquidation of 
the Reserve Primary Fund, a money-market 
fund that held Lehman debt. This triggered 
a run on money-market funds, including 
funds with no direct exposure to Lehman, a 
major source of  short-term funding for finan-
cial and nonfinancial companies.  Short-term 
funding, on which the financial system had 
become increasingly reliant, became scarce. 
Creditors became concerned about the via-
bility of borrowers and they hoarded liquidity 
as a precaution against a further deepening 
of the crisis. In short, the days following the 
Lehman bankruptcy look more like a fund-
ing run than a cascade of defaults. By the 
end of the week, the Treasury Department 
stepped in to guarantee money-market fund 
assets in an effort to revive  short-term lend-
ing. Without a government guarantee, mon-
ey-market funds might have been forced 
to sell illiquid assets to meet redemptions. 
A fire sale of illiquid assets would have 
driven down their prices, decreasing the 
market value of similar assets held by other 
financial institutions.
The aftermath of the Lehman bankruptcy 
illustrates multiple avenues for contagion: a 
direct loss imposed on the Reserve Primary 
Fund, “information contagion” that spread 
fears to other money-market funds, a fund-
ing run as creditors pulled back lending, 
and potential fire sales. Network opacity 
heightened uncertainty in the  lead-up to the 
Lehman bankruptcy. According to the FCIC 
report, “there was no way to know who 
would be owed how much and when pay-
ments would have to be made—information 
that would be critically important to analyze 
the possible impact of a Lehman bankruptcy 
on derivatives counterparties and the finan-
cial markets” (p. 329). 
2.3 Mortgage-Funding Chains
Subprime lending and changes in the 
mortgage market featured prominently in 
the unfolding of the financial crisis. In tra-
ditional mortgage lending, a bank evaluates 
and monitors the creditworthiness of the 
borrower and the value of the mortgaged 
property. With securitization, the ultimate 
lender and borrower are often separated by 
a chain of intermediaries.
Figure 1 (adapted from Shin 2010) illus-
trates a possible chain. Households take on 
mortgage debt, mortgages are pooled into 
securities, the securities are sold to dealers, 
the dealers pledge the securities as collat-
eral to borrow from commercial banks, 
commercial banks fund themselves by 
issuing  short-term debt to  money-market 
funds, and money-market funds take depos-
its from households. The arrows in the 
figure indicate the direction of payment 
obligations.
The chain illustrates several points: The 
nodes in the chain can be highly hetero-
geneous in their structure and function—
heterogeneity that is often overlooked in 
network models. At each step in the chain, 
there is a potential loss of information about 
the quality of the underlying debt. Leverage 
along each step in the chain amplifies shocks 
to the underlying real-estate value. Shin 
(2010) argues that shocks are amplified 
because financial institutions increase their 
borrowing and lending to each other to 
increase their leverage while the supply of 
real assets remains relatively fixed.
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2.4 Hedge Funds and The Quant Meltdown
During the first week of August 2007, 
many hedge funds following quantitative 
trading strategies suffered large losses, in 
some cases leading the funds to close. The 
abnormal market behavior lasted just a few 
days, but the damage was enough to dis-
credit many “quant” investment strategies. 
In retrospect, the turmoil of that week was 
also a harbinger of the crisis to come.
For our purposes, the incident is a valu-
able example of contagion through cor-
related assets and strategies, rather than 
through contractual obligations. The events 
of that week can be summarized as follows 
(Rothman 2007; Khandani and Lo 2007). 
Due to an initial shock outside the stock mar-
ket—perhaps losses on  mortgage-backed 
securities—some funds were forced to sell 
assets. To raise cash quickly, they sold their 
most liquid assets, namely US equities. 
Algorithms at other quant funds reacted by 
joining the  sell-off, and the pattern contin-
ued for a few days. Khandani and Lo (2007) 
detail the cascade of losses from one type 
of strategy to the next each day. This was 
not a conventional fire sale—the assets sold 
were highly liquid—but rather a rush to 
the exit that triggered a rapid deleveraging. 
Losses spread through price correlations 
and exposures to common factors, rather 
than through direct connections between 
the affected funds.
2.5 The Savings and Loan Crisis
Our final historical incident serves as an 
example of widespread failures through 
common exposures. Rising interest rates in 
the early 1980s challenged savings and loan 
institutions, which had to pay market rates 
on deposits but earned fixed rates on the 
mortgages they had issued. Deregulation 
allowed these institutions to shift to riskier 
Figure 1. A Funding Chain
Note: The arrows indicate the direction of payments due. Funding flows clockwise through the chain. Adapted 
from Shin (2010).
 
Money-market
fund 
Commercial bankSecurities dealer
Mortgage-backed
securities issuer 
Mortgage pool
HouseholdsHouseholds
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commercial real-estate lending in an attempt 
to make up losses. By the end of the 1980s, 
hundreds of savings and loan institutions had 
failed at an estimated cost of $160 billion 
(FDIC 1997). From a network perspective, 
these were isolated nodes with minimal, if 
any, direct exposures to each other. They 
failed together because of common expo-
sure to interest-rate risk and because many 
of them were located in the same regional 
real-estate market (the southwestern United 
States).
One could point to many other historical 
examples, but these suffice to illustrate the 
mechanisms network models need to take 
into account. In the rest of this article, we 
will revisit the mechanisms introduced in 
the examples of this section, with particular 
emphasis on the two that are primarily net-
work effects—loss spillovers and funding 
runs. Fire sales, information contagion, cor-
related risks, and common exposures do not 
require a network of payment obligations, 
although they can amplify network effects. 
At several points, we will also stress hetero-
geneity and opacity as essential aspects of 
financial networks, though these features are 
often overlooked in simple models.
3. Networks of Interlinked Balance Sheets
3.1 Balance Sheet Components
Figure 2 shows a stylized balance sheet of 
a financial institution, which for brevity we 
shall call a bank. The bank (indexed by i) has 
two categories of assets—outside assets and 
 in-network assets. Outside assets ci are claims 
on nonfinancial entities, such as mortgages 
and commercial loans.  In-network assets 
are claims on other banks; these include 
interbank loans and exposures through 
derivatives. We denote by   
_
 p ki the payment 
obligation of bank k to bank i. The bank’s 
liabilities include obligations bi to nonfinan-
cial entities—for example, depositors—and 
obligations   
_
 pij to other banks j. The differ-
ence between the bank’s assets and liabilities 
yields the bank’s net worth wi. The figure is 
purely schematic and is not intended to indi-
cate the relative magnitudes of the various 
parts of the balance sheet.
The links between balance sheets define a 
network. Each node is a bank, and a directed 
edge runs from node i to node j if bank i has 
a payment obligation to node j. (All entities 
outside the network can be represented 
Figure 2. A Stylized Balance Sheet for Bank i
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through a single node representing the 
“outside.”)
To put this network in context, we recall 
key functions of the financial system:
•  facilitating payments;
•   allocating  capital  by  intermediating 
between lenders and borrowers, and 
also between investors and businesses;
•   managing  liquidity  and maturity  trans-
formation in intermediating between 
lenders who prefer to lend for short 
maturities and borrowers who prefer to 
borrow for longer maturities;
•   providing  risk  transfer  from  agents 
seeking to reduce risk to others will-
ing to bear greater risk if compensated 
through higher returns.
The first of these roles is inherently a 
network operation, requiring links between 
buyers, sellers, and banks. Several stud-
ies have examined the network structure 
of  large-value payment systems (such as 
Fedwire and CHIPS in the United States 
and TARGET2 in Europe), and we return 
to these in section 9. Allocating capital deals 
primarily with investing the outside liabili-
ties bi into outside assets ci. This process 
entails converting the illiquid,  long-dated 
assets ci into  money-like claims bi. The 
resulting maturity and liquidity transfor-
mation leaves banks vulnerable to a loss of 
funding, and interbank borrowing and lend-
ing serves to help banks manage the risk of 
fluctuations in their outside funding. Banks 
also help corporations manage their expo-
sures to exchange rates, interest rates, and 
commodity prices through derivatives and 
other contracts; the banks hedge this risk by 
trading with other banks.
Interbank claims thus arise as a mecha-
nism through which banks can share risks. 
But these same links become channels 
through which problems at one bank can 
spread to another. The trade-off between 
the costs and benefits of interconnectedness 
is one of the main themes of the financial 
networks literature.
3.2 Channels of Contagion
We can use figure 2 to revisit some of 
the channels for contagion touched on in 
 section 2. A shock to the value of bank i’s 
assets would cause a drop in ci. This asset 
shock could be a drop in the value of real 
estate or a downturn in an industrial sector 
to which the bank has made loans. A drop in 
ci is initially absorbed by the bank’s net worth 
wi. But if the shock is sufficiently large, the 
net worth is wiped out, the bank is unable to 
fully repay its liabilities, and it defaults. In 
particular, its actual payment  p ij to bank j will 
be less than its promised payment   
_
 p ij . If the 
payment shortfall is sufficiently large, it can 
push bank j to default as well, and so on. An 
initial asset shock to one bank can spill over 
to other banks, creating a cascade of defaults.
As this discussion illustrates, we distin-
guish between a bank’s promised payment 
and its actual payment to another bank. 
More generally, we may distinguish between 
the face value   
_
 pij of bank i’s obligation to 
bank j and the market value of this obliga-
tion. In the simplest case, the two remain the 
same until bank i defaults. More generally, 
the market value may decline as bank i’s net 
worth shrinks, even if the bank remains sol-
vent (meaning wi > 0). In this case, a shock 
to bank i can impose a loss on bank j through 
a “marking to market” of the value of i’s obli-
gation to j, even without a default.
Another type of contagion arises when 
banks pull funding from one another. Such 
a funding run can be triggered by an unex-
pected liquidity shock, as in Diamond and 
Dybvig (1983), and the literature that builds 
on their framework. In the balance sheet of 
figure 2, a liquidity shock arises as a reduc-
tion in bi. With its funding reduced, the 
bank needs to reduce its assets, as well. If 
it withdraws its lending to other banks—its 
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 in-network assets—those banks will in turn 
need to reduce their lending, creating a 
funding run.
Figure 2 suggests other ways in which 
bank balance sheets may interact. Banks may 
have common exposures through their out-
side assets—real estate, for example—and 
may thus be subject to correlated shocks. A 
disclosure by one bank about its assets may 
lead creditors to make inferences about the 
assets held by other banks, producing “infor-
mation contagion.” If one bank is forced to 
sell illiquid assets and in so doing, drives 
down the price of these assets, then other 
banks holding similar assets incur a  fire-sale 
externality through the price drop. Although 
these dynamics can arise even in the absence 
of a network, that is, in a collection of iso-
lated banks, they are further amplified 
when banks have obligations to one another. 
In what follows, however, we shall focus 
mainly on those sources of contagion, such 
as asset and funding shocks, whose operation 
depends on interconnections between banks.
3.3 A Simple Network Example
To illustrate the spread of shocks through 
interlinked balance sheets, consider the 
example in figure 3. The number on each 
directed edge represents a payment obli-
gation, and each node’s net worth is shown 
A
120
150
150
4
180
180
10
10
10
100
100
100
100
160
30
50
204
D C
B
Figure 3. A Hypothetical Financial Network Showing Payments Due
Note: The net worth of each node is shown in bold. The outside sector consists of households and nonfinancial 
firms.
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in bold. For example, consider bank C. It 
is owed 160 by outside entities—house-
holds, say, with mortgage obligations—and 
it owes 50 to a possibly different set of 
households or depositors. Additionally, C 
is owed 100 by bank B and it owes 100 to 
each of banks A and D; these obligations 
might take the form of unsecured overnight 
loans for example. The difference between 
bank C’s assets (160 + 100) and its liabilities 
(50 + 100 + 100) leave it with a net worth 
of 10.
Suppose that the economy is hit by a 
shock that causes some households to 
default on their payments to bank C: 
instead of the promised 160, they pay only 
40. Then C defaults because its assets total 
100 + 40 = 140 whereas it owes 50 to the 
outside sector and 200 to other banks. In this 
case, we assume that C’s remaining assets are 
paid pro rata to C’s creditors. As we shall see, 
C’s assets may turn out to be worth even less 
than 140, because its default may trigger a 
chain of defaults that lead back to C.
To work through these spillover effects, 
we proceed by computing “interim” payoffs 
as follows. If we take the interim value of C’s 
assets to be 140, the pro rata rule implies that 
C pays (100/250) × 140 = 56 to D, 56 to A, 
and 28 to the outside depositors. Now D 
has assets worth 204 + 56 = 260 and debts 
totalling 300, so D is in default. The pro rata 
rule implies that D pays 130 to A and 130 to 
its outside depositors. At this stage A’s assets 
have interim value 120 + 130 + 56 = 306, 
whereas its nominal obligations come to 360. 
Thus, A defaults and the pro rata rule implies 
that it pays  one-half of its assets to B, namely 
153, and an equal amount to outside depos-
itors. At this juncture, B’s assets are worth 
153 + 30 = 183, whereas its obligations total 
200. Therefore, B defaults and the pro rata 
rule implies that it pays 91.5 to C and 91.5 to 
outside depositors.
At this point, we discover that the value 
of 140 we used for C’s assets was incorrect. 
That value reflected the initial outside shock 
of 40, but it assumed full repayment of 100 
from bank B. In fact, B is able to pay at most 
91.5, so C’s assets are worth at most 131.5 
and the cycle must be repeated. Because of 
this cascade of defaults, determining the con-
sequences of the initial shock is a  fixed-point 
problem, as analyzed by Eisenberg and Noe 
(2001), which we take up in greater detail in 
section 5.
We now use the same example to illus-
trate a funding run. Reverse the direction 
of all arrows in figure 3. In this interpreta-
tion, bank C has raised 260 in funding, but 
extended only 250 in loans. The difference of 
10 is a cash buffer—an asset now, not a lia-
bility. The initial shock reduces the amount 
bank C has raised from households from 160 
to 40. This is now a funding shock, rather 
than an asset shock; households have expe-
rienced an unexpected demand for liquidity 
and withdrawn 120 of their deposits.
Bank C can manage a small funding shock 
through its cash buffer of 10. But to meet 
the withdrawal of 120, it needs to reduce 
its lending. For simplicity, suppose it does 
so pro rata. Following the same arithmetic 
as before, it reduces its lending to banks D 
and A to 56 each, and it reduces its outside 
lending to 28. Eventually, we find that the 
funding run causes bank B to pull some of 
its lending to bank C, so that C’s funding loss 
ends up being larger than the initial shock. 
The mechanics of this funding run are sim-
ilar2 to the mechanics of the default cascade 
we described first, but the interpretation is 
different. Both mechanisms are important 
in practice, and the two may operate simul-
taneously. We will discuss models based on 
liquidity shocks in section 4 and then return 
to default cascades in section 5.
We have kept the example of figure 3 sim-
ple for illustration. Additional features will 
2 A formal duality between the two mechanisms is 
developed in Chapter 6 of Hurd (2015).
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be discussed in later sections. In particular, 
shocks can be amplified through bankruptcy 
costs, in the case of a default cascade, and 
liquidation costs and liquidity hoarding in a 
funding run. One can replace the assumption 
of a pro rata allocation with different levels 
of priority. Balance sheets can be enriched to 
include more detail on assets and liabilities.
4. Liquidity Risk Sharing and Funding 
Runs
In this section, we examine a key trade-
off in financial networks: interbank lending 
helps banks manage liquidity risk, but it also 
creates channels through which shocks can 
spread from one bank to another. The rele-
vant literature is large, and we will not try to 
be comprehensive in our coverage. Instead, 
we will anchor our discussion around two 
models that highlight important features of 
the broader literature. The first model, due 
to Allen and Gale (2000), provides detailed 
foundations for the actions of banks and 
depositors and focuses on a network of four 
banks. A second line of work, exemplified 
by the model of Gai, Haldane, and Kapadia 
(2011), relies on  reduced-form descriptions 
of the interactions between banks and strives 
to describe aggregate behavior in large 
networks.
4.1 The Allen and Gale (2000) Model
In the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model 
of bank runs, a bank is exposed to the risk 
of a liquidity preference shock in which a 
fraction of depositors withdraw their depos-
its early for reasons exogenous to the model. 
Early withdrawals may force the bank to 
liquidate illiquid  long-term assets and incur 
costs in doing so.
In the model of Allen and Gale (2000), 
interbank lending networks allow banks in 
different regions or sectors to share liquid-
ity risk because the liquidity shocks they face 
are negatively correlated. Lending by banks 
with excess liquidity to banks with a liquidity 
shortage can prevent costly early liquidation 
of  long-term assets.
The model has the following elements 
within each region:
•   Time evolves over three dates, 0, 1, 2.
•   At  time  0,  consumers  deposit  their 
endowments in banks; at time 1, a 
 fraction of consumers experience a 
liquidity shock and seek to withdraw 
their deposits; at time 2, the bank’s 
remaining assets are paid to remaining 
depositors.
•   Banks  can  invest  in  a  liquid  short  asset 
and an illiquid long asset; the long asset 
earns a higher return if held to time 2, 
but a lower return if liquidated at time 1.
In the baseline case, bank holdings of 
the short asset are sufficient to meet the 
withdrawals of consumers who receive the 
liquidity shock at time 1, and the remaining 
“patient” consumers earn a higher return by 
waiting until time 2 to withdraw. But with a 
large liquidity shock, a bank is forced to incur 
the cost of early liquidation of the long asset, 
and “patient” consumers may optimally 
decide to withdraw their deposits early.3
Interbank lending across regions can help 
mitigate this risk. Allen and Gale (2000) first 
consider a case in which initially identical 
regions differ in the severity of the liquidity 
shock they receive, holding the overall sever-
ity constant. When one region has a higher 
fraction of impatient consumers, another 
region has a lower fraction of impatient con-
sumers. Because they are ex ante identical, 
banks in the different regions hold the same 
level of short assets. At time 1, the liquidity 
3 In particular, a bank run in Allen and Gale (2000) is 
rational and due to bank fundamentals. In Diamond and 
Dybvig (1983), a bank run results from a coordination fail-
ure among depositors, rather than from the condition of 
the bank.
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shortfall in regions with a high fraction of 
impatient consumers is offset by the excess 
supply of liquidity in regions with a low frac-
tion of impatient consumers. Anticipating 
this outcome, but not knowing which regions 
will receive which shocks, banks lend to 
each other by exchanging a fraction of their 
deposits across regions, eliminating the risk 
that results from the disparity in the shocks.
Allen and Gale (2000) then show that 
interbank lending, while allowing risk shar-
ing, can also create financial fragility. They 
introduce a state in which the fraction of 
early depositors takes its average value in all 
regions except for one in which the fraction 
is strictly higher. This state is unanticipated 
by banks and consumers at time 0, so the 
total supply of short assets held by banks is 
insufficient to meet withdrawals at time 1. 
Interbank lending cannot solve the problem 
of meeting the aggregate demand of early 
consumers. Banks in the region with the 
highest liquidity shock are forced to liquidate 
some of their long assets at time 1, incurring 
liquidation costs. If the shock is sufficiently 
large, depositors cannot be fully repaid, 
including banks from other regions holding 
deposits in the affected region. Interbank 
deposits, which enable risk sharing in the 
original model, thus become a channel for 
the spread of losses after an unexpectedly 
large liquidity shock.
The transmission mechanism combines 
the two mechanisms illustrated through fig-
ure 3 in section 3.3. The initial shock is a 
liquidity shock. But when a bank is forced 
to liquidate the long asset early, the cost it 
incurs can lower the value of its liabilities, 
including the deposits made by other banks. 
The other banks withdraw their deposits, as 
in a funding run, but they recover less than 
the promised amount, as in a default cascade. 
The two effects are determined simultane-
ously because the lending bank withdraws 
its deposits precisely when the deposits are 
worth less than the promised amount.
Allen and Gale (2000) compare the fragil-
ity of alternative network topologies. A ring 
network, in which each bank borrows from 
exactly one other bank, is particularly frag-
ile. If the initial shock and liquidation costs 
are sufficiently severe to bankrupt one bank, 
then the loss of value in that bank’s liabilities 
is concentrated on the one bank from which 
it borrowed, potentially pushing that bank 
into default. This leads to a default cascade 
around the ring, if the shock is sufficiently 
large. In contrast, in a completely connected 
network, where every bank lends to every 
other bank, the impact of the first default 
is diluted among other banks; a larger ini-
tial shock is required for defaults to spread. 
Banks may also be separated into groups, 
with interbank lending within groups, but 
not across groups. This allows liquidity risk 
sharing within groups, but creates a fire wall 
that prevents losses from spreading across 
groups. One of the themes of Allen and Gale 
(2000) is the interplay between network 
topology and the correlation in liquidity 
shocks across the network.
4.2. Some Closely Related Models
The model of Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet 
(2000) is driven by the movement of deposi-
tors from one region to another, rather than 
by exogenous liquidity shocks. The model 
builds on the  Diamond–Dybvig (1983) 
model, but sets parameters so that no depos-
itors would need to withdraw their deposits 
from a solvent bank before the final date. 
In other words, the model has no impatient 
consumers.
Migration prompts consumers to consider 
moving deposits from one bank to another 
at the intermediate date. Interbank credit 
allows banks to avoid costly liquidation in 
meeting early withdrawals. But, as in Allen 
and Gale (2000), these links can also become 
a channel for contagion. A bank may become 
insolvent because of poor returns on its 
investments, and the response of depositors 
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and the structure of interbank links deter-
mine whether the failure of one bank forces 
the early liquidation of others. In particular, 
Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet (2000) contrast 
two topologies: a ring network and a com-
pletely connected network. They show that 
depositors are less likely to run in the ring 
network because in this case an insolvent 
bank can pass a greater fraction of its losses 
to other banks. In the terminology of Freixas, 
Parigi, and Rochet (2000), depositors impose 
greater market discipline on banks in the 
completely connected network, making this 
configuration less resilient.
Because interbank lending allows for the 
sharing of liquidity risk, it creates moral 
hazard: after a bank reduces its vulnerabil-
ity to a liquidity shock, it has an incentive 
to take on greater risk in its investments. 
Brusco and Castiglionesi (2007) modify the 
Allen and Gale (2000) model to incorporate 
this effect. (See Zawadowski 2013 for a dif-
ferent type of network model with moral 
hazard.) The main source of risk in Brusco 
and Castiglionesi (2007) comes from banks’ 
investments in risky assets (through moral 
hazard), and more links between banks 
create more opportunities for bad invest-
ment outcomes at one bank to spill over to 
other banks. In their model, a completely 
connected network is less stable than a ring 
network.
4.3 The Gai, Haldane, and Kapadia (2011) 
Model
Like the model of Allen and Gale (2000), 
the model of Gai, Haldane, and Kapadia 
(2011) examines the interaction between 
liquidity shocks and interconnectedness. 
The two papers are representative of two 
broader strands of literature. The  Allen–
Gale framework seeks to endogenize the 
actions of banks and outside depositors; 
doing so generally limits the analysis to sim-
ple networks. Gai, Haldane, and Kapadia 
(2011) (briefly, GHK) consider more  general 
networks and more varied bank balance 
sheets. To accommodate this generality, 
their analysis relies on simple rules for bank 
behavior and on numerical experiments for 
conclusions. Their simulation framework 
offers the flexibility to compare policy alter-
natives. It builds on an analytic framework 
in Gai and Kapadia (2010), but the earlier 
model describes default cascades rather than 
funding runs.
To describe their model, we return to the 
example of figure 3 under the funding run 
interpretation in section 3.3—the second 
of the two interpretations given there. In 
 figure 4, we zoom in on the balance sheets of 
nodes B and C. Bank B has extended a loan 
of 100 to bank C. It has 100 in fixed assets and 
10 in liquid assets. This terminology follows 
GHK and introduces a distinction between 
two types of outside assets in figure 2: liquid 
assets can be easily disposed of, but prohib-
itive liquidation costs preclude the selling of 
fixed assets. Bank B has borrowed 180 from 
other banks. It also has 30 in what we refer to 
in figure 4 as stable funding—this term is not 
used in GHK. Stable funding includes both 
outside deposits and equity or net worth. We 
combine these two because they function 
equivalently in the model; neither gets with-
drawn in a funding run.
Suppose now that bank B withdraws 50 
of its funding from bank C. As discussed in 
GHK, bank C cannot quickly make up the loss 
of funding by increasing its outside deposits 
or raising new equity—that is, by increas-
ing its stable funding. It may be unable or 
unwilling to find another bank to borrow 
from because of the negative signal that the 
need to borrow would send to the market. If 
it sold its fixed assets, it would incur liquida-
tion costs. Bank C’s best option is to withdraw 
funding from banks A and D, thus propagat-
ing the initial shock through the network.
In our discussion of figure 3, we assumed 
a minimal withdrawal by each bank. In 
 figure 4, the minimal response would have 
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bank C pull 20 in funding from each of banks 
A and D, which combined with C’s liquid 
assets would make up the shortfall of 50. But 
GHK observe that in a crisis—notably in the 
most recent one—banks respond to shocks 
by hoarding liquidity, meaning that they 
reduce their lending more than they need in 
order to cover their own funding shortfall. In 
particular, banks may view an initial shock as 
a warning of greater scarcity to come and, as 
a precaution, increase their buffer of liquid 
assets by reducing their lending. In the set-
ting of figure 4, bank C may respond to its 
initial loss of 50 in funding by pulling up to 
200 in loans from banks A and D. In GHK, 
the extent of liquidity hoarding is controlled 
by a multiplier, and the larger this value, the 
greater the amplification of the initial shock. 
For most of their results, GHK assume a 
maximum multiplier, that is, a bank with-
draws all of its lending to other banks if its 
buffer of liquid assets is depleted.
Figure 4 omits important features from 
the more detailed balance sheets in GHK. 
In particular, their interbank loans include 
repurchase agreements, or “repo” transac-
tions. These are secured loans, backed by 
assets that are pledged as collateral. Repo 
transactions are very short term (typically 
 1–7 days) and therefore easily withdrawn; 
indeed, the growth in  short-term funding 
prior to the crisis is widely viewed as a major 
contributor to the turmoil of  2007–08.
A repo transaction carries a “haircut,” 
which is the difference between the amount 
lent and the value of the collateral. For exam-
ple, in figure 4, banks A and D might each 
provide 105 in collateral to borrow 100 from 
bank C, and bank C may then pledge 105 of 
this collateral to borrow 100 from bank B. 
In GHK, liquidity shocks in the interbank 
lending market are expressed through wider 
haircuts: if bank B widens the haircut it 
applies to bank C, this reduces the amount C 
 
50
Fixed assets
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Liquid assets
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100
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Due from A
100
Due from D
C
B
Figure 4. Interlinked Balance Sheets for a Model of Liquidity Hoarding
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can borrow from B, holding fixed C’s supply 
of collateral assets.4 Wider haircuts may be 
idiosyncratic, reflecting  heightened  concerns 
about an individual bank, or they may be sys-
tematic, reflecting general concerns about 
liquidity or deteriorating quality of collat-
eral assets (such as mortgage bonds). GHK 
examine both types of shocks. They apply 
these shocks to randomly generated net-
works to evaluate the consequences. There 
are no defaults in GHK; in contrast to most 
of the financial networks literature, they 
focus on the likelihood and severity of what 
might be called a funding crisis. More spe-
cifically, they estimate the probability that at 
least 10 percent of banks will need to with-
draw funding from other banks and, condi-
tional on reaching this threshold, the fraction 
of banks affected.
Their experiments consider many varia-
tions, with a particular focus on the effect of 
increasing connectivity among banks, which 
they measure through the average number 
of banks from which each bank borrows. 
They find that increasing connectivity first 
increases and then decreases the probability 
of a funding crisis; however, the severity of a 
crisis, conditional on the occurrence of a cri-
sis, consistently increases with connectivity.
Despite major differences in models, this 
finding is broadly consistent with Allen and 
Gale (2000) and several other papers. It 
reflects the  trade-off we highlighted earlier: 
greater interbank links serve both to dilute 
shocks and to propagate shocks. The GHK 
model allows a systematic examination of 
this effect under various assumptions. In 
contrast, the configurations in Allen and 
Gale (2000) are much simpler, but they illus-
trate the interplay between network topology 
and the correlation in initial funding shocks 
across banks.
4  See Gorton (2010) for a discussion of the role of wid-
ening repo haircuts in 2007.
A few features of the GHK model are 
worth mentioning because they raise issues 
that will recur in our discussion. In their 
numerical experiments, GHK hold banks’ 
total level of interbank borrowing fixed as 
they increase the number of links, and each 
bank’s total interbank borrowing is evenly 
divided among the banks from which it 
borrows. Increasing the number of links 
between banks thus reduces the amount 
borrowed over each link. An alternative 
notion of connectivity, to which we return 
in section 7.2, counts dollars borrowed from 
banks rather than the number of banks from 
which they are borrowed, and this can lead 
to rather different conclusions. The random 
networks in GHK generate banks that are ex 
ante identical; we will argue that heteroge-
neity is important—both empirically and for 
model implications.
5. Basic Network Models
In this section, we describe a model due 
to Eisenberg and Noe (2001) that forms 
the basis of much subsequent work on con-
tagion in financial networks. We start by 
assuming that the network of obligations 
is given; the object is to study how shocks 
to particular institutions or assets propa-
gate through the network. The model has 
four key ingredients (see figure 2): (1) a set 
of n nodes  N = {1, 2,  .  .  . , n} representing 
different financial entities such as banks, 
 broker-dealers, insurance companies, and 
the like; (2) an n × n liabilities matrix 
P ̅ = [  p ̅ ij ] where  p ̅ ij ≥ 0 represents the 
payment due from node i to node j at the 
end of the current period and  
_
 p ii = 0 for 
every  i ; (3) a vector  c = ( c 1 ,  c 2 , .  .  . ,  c n ) ∈  R + n   where  c i ≥ 0 repre sents the total payments 
due from nonfinancial entities to node i; 
and (4) a vector  b = ( b 1 ,  b 2 , .  .  . ,  b n ) ∈  R + n  
where  b i ≥ 0 represents the total payments 
due from node i to nonfinancial entities. The 
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numbers  c i and  b i will be called i’s outside 
assets and outside liabilities, respectively.5
The asset side of node i’s balance sheet is 
given by  c i +  ∑ j≠i   p ̅ ji  , and the liability side 
by  p ̅ i =  b i +  ∑ j≠i   p ̅ ij  . The node’s value is the 
total value of its assets, namely  c i +  ∑ j≠i   p ̅ ji  . 
The node’s net worth is
(1)  w i   =  c i +  ∑ 
j≠i
 
   
_
 p ji −  p ̅ i . 
We shall assume that, initially, the net worth of 
every node is strictly positive. We then exam-
ine what happens when the outside assets 
suffer a negative shock, possibly causing the 
net worth of one or more nodes to become 
negative. A shock realization will be repre-
sented by an  n-vector  x = (  x 1 ,  x 2 , .  .  . ,  x n ) 
where  0 ≤  x i ≤  c i  for  1 ≤ i ≤ n . The direct 
effect of the shock x is to reduce the net 
worth of each node i to the value
(2)   w i   (x) =  c i −  x i +  ∑ 
j≠i
 
  
_
 pji −  p ̅ i . 
If  w i   (x)  is negative, node i defaults. We shall 
assume that all debt obligations have equal 
priority and that in case of default, the assets 
are distributed to the creditors in proportion 
to the nominal amounts they are owed. (The 
equity holders are wiped out, since their claim 
is on the firm’s net worth, provided the latter 
is positive.) The problem is to determine a 
consistent set of payments conditional on the 
initial shock. We have already encountered 
this problem in our illustration of a default 
cascade using figure 3 in section 3.3.
5 The notion of outside assets and outside liabilities is a 
variant of the  Eisenberg–Noe framework that is common 
in the literature (see, among others, Elsinger 2009 and 
Glasserman and Young 2015). It can be seen as a special 
case of  Eisenberg–Noe by positing a fictitious node that 
holds all of the outside liabilities as assets and all of the 
outside assets as liabilities. 
To this end, let us define the relative liabil-
ities matrix  A = ( a ij ) to be the n × n matrix 
with entries
(3)   a ij =  p ̅ ij /  p ̅ i  if   p ̅ i > 0
  a ij = 0    if   p ̅ i = 0 .
The term  a ij represents the proportion that 
i’s obligations to node j represent of its 
total liabilities to all other nodes and to the 
 external sector. In what follows, we shall 
assume that from every node i there exists 
a chain of positive obligations to some node 
j, such that  b j > 0 . This seems like a rea-
sonable assumption for  real-world financial 
networks; it also guarantees that the spec-
tral radius (the absolute value of the largest 
eigenvalue) of the relative liabilities matrix A 
is less than one. This is useful in character-
izing the equilibria of the system, a subject 
that we turn to next.
5.1 Clearing Payments
Suppose that the outside assets suffer a 
shock, x. We shall say that node i suffers a 
direct default if  x i >  w i   =  c i +  ∑ j≠i   _ p ji −  p ̅ i . 
The pro rata allocation rule implies that i’s pay-
ments are proportional to the various claims 
against i’s assets. The complication is that the 
value of i’s assets depends on the payments 
made by others to i. Thus i’s payment to j 
(conditional on x) satisfies
(4)   p ij (x) ≤  a ij  ( c i −  x i +  ∑ k≠i
 
  p ki (x)) + , 
where  ∑ k≠i    p ki (x) is the sum of payments 
to i from the other nodes in the system. In 
particular, the payment  p ki (x) will be less 
than  p ̅ ki if node k is also in default. We shall 
say that the payments  p ij (x) are consistent if, 
for all  i and  j 
(5)  p ij (x) =  p ̅ ij ∧  a ij  ( c i −  x i +  ∑ k≠i   p ki (x) ) + .
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This condition can be expressed in a more 
compact form as follows. Let  p i (x) denote the 
total payment from i to all other nodes in the 
financial system plus its payments to the out-
side sector. Let  p(x) = (  p 1 (x),  .  .  . ,  p n (x)) be 
the corresponding payments vector. These 
payments are consistent if, for every  i ,
(6)  p i (x) =  p ̅ i ∧  ( c i −  x i +  ∑ j 
 
  a ji  p j (x)) + . 
Expression (5) follows from (6) by apply-
ing the pro rata distribution rule in case 
of default. Any vector  p(x) ∈  R + n satisfying 
(6) is called a clearing vector. As shown by 
Eisenberg and Noe (2001), a clearing vector 
always exists; moreover, under our assump-
tion on the matrix A the clearing vector is 
unique for any shock realization x.
Clearing vectors can be computed via 
the following recursive procedure known as 
the fictitious default algorithm (Eisenberg 
and Noe 2001).6 For a given shock reali-
zation x, let  p = p(x) and define the map-
ping  Φ :  R + n →  R + n as follows:
(7)  ∀ i,  Φ i (p) =  p ̅ i ∧  ( c i −  x i +  ∑ j 
 
  p j  a ji ) + . 
Starting with  p 0 =  p ̅ let
(8)   p 1 = Φ(  p 0 ),    p 2 = Φ(  p 1 ),  . . . . 
This iteration yields a monotone decreas-
ing sequence  p 0 ≥  p 1 ≥  p 2 . . . . Since the 
sequence is bounded below by the zero vec-
tor, it has a limit, say  p′ = p′(x) . Since  Φ is 
continuous,  p′ satisfies (6), hence it is a clear-
ing vector.
In section 3 we considered the problem 
of finding a clearing vector for the exam-
ple in figure 3. The calculation given there 
 represents one iteration of this algorithm. 
6 This procedure is analogous to solving a Leontief 
 input–output system via iteration. 
The reader may verify that successive appli-
cation of the algorithm leads to the solu-
tion shown in figure 5. Here the incoming 
payments equal the outgoing payments at 
every node, and the payments from each 
node are distributed in proportion to the 
nominal amounts owed. Thus, we obtain a 
mutually consistent (equilibrium) set of pay-
ments; moreover, under our assumptions it 
is unique. 
The existence of a clearing vector is 
a consequence of a general  fixed-point 
theorem on lattices due to Tarski 
(1955). Consider the  complete lattice 
 L = { x ∈  R n : 0 ≤ x ≤  p ̅} with the partial 
order  x ≤ y ⇔  x 1 ≤  y 1 , .  .  . ,  x n ≤  y n . Tarski’s 
theorem states that every monotone func-
tion  F : L → L has at least one fixed point; 
moreover it has a greatest fixed point and 
a least fixed point. This result immediately 
implies the existence of a vector satisfying 
(7), because the mapping  Φ(p) is monotone 
nondecreasing in  p . This result underpins 
various extensions of the  Eisenberg-Noe 
model, as we shall see in subsequent sections.
5.2 Extensions of The Basic Model
The preceding model provides a sim-
ple and transparent way of representing 
the interlocking assets and liabilities in the 
financial system. In particular, the model 
illustrates how defaults can be transmit-
ted from one node to another, potentially 
amplifying the impact of an initial shock. 
Nevertheless, the model is oversimplified 
in several respects. One limitation is that 
when default occurs, it is assumed that the 
available assets are distributed pro rata to 
the creditors without further impairment. In 
practice, defaults can seriously disrupt the 
distribution of assets and entail significant 
costs that further reduce the value of the 
assets to the downstream claimants. These 
costs amplify the initial shock as they course 
through the financial network. In the next 
section, we shall show how to incorporate 
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bankruptcy costs into the model in a general 
way; we shall revisit this topic in more detail 
in section 8.7.
A second limitation is that the model puts 
all claims on the same footing in case of 
default. In reality, banks have a great vari-
ety of claims against one another, including 
secured and unsecured loans, derivatives, 
equity stakes, and other financial instru-
ments that have different degrees of priority 
when default occurs. In section 5.4, we shall 
show how to extend the model to incorporate 
interbank equity claims as well as interbank 
debt obligations. Other types of claims and 
levels of seniority can be accommodated in 
similar fashion.
A third limitation of the model is that it 
treats financial crises as if they originated 
solely from a reduction in payments. In fact, 
there are many other forms of financial con-
tagion where interconnections play a key 
role, but the source of contagion does not 
arise from payment shortfalls. One example 
is the funding run discussed in section 4.3, 
which can trigger a widespread contraction 
of credit in the financial system. Another 
example is a fire sale. Suppose that one bank 
must sell some of its illiquid assets in order to 
raise cash or meet regulatory capital require-
ments. The price of these assets will then be 
driven down, which has a negative impact 
on the balance sheets of other banks, trig-
gering further sales and a downward price 
spiral. The basic mechanics of this model 
are discussed in section 5.5 and revisited in 
section 11. 
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Figure 5. Clearing Payments When the Outside Sector Pays 40 Instead of 160 to Bank C
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Yet another source of financial contagion 
is a loss of confidence in the creditworthi-
ness of particular institutions. Doubts about 
the quality of one bank’s assets will have a 
negative impact on the perceived value of 
its liabilities to other banks, which will have 
a negative impact on their balance sheets, 
and so forth. Thus, what began as a loss of 
confidence in one bank (but not its outright 
default) can have  knock-on effects that cas-
cade through the financial system. In our 
view, this  loss-of-confidence effect, which 
we discuss further in section 5.6, is one of 
the most important channels through which 
the financial network amplifies systemic risk 
in practice. 
5.3 Bankruptcy Costs and Asset Recovery 
Rates
When a bank defaults, there will typically 
be delays in paying its creditors, in addition 
to legal and administrative costs. Thus, only 
a fraction of the firm’s assets will be available 
for distribution to the creditors. These costs 
increase both the magnitude and the likeli-
hood of default cascades. Rogers and Veraart 
(2013) show how such costs can be incorpo-
rated into the  Eisenberg–Noe framework 
using a recovery function that drops discon-
tinuously at the default boundary and then 
decreases linearly with the amount of assets 
available. More generally, one can posit a 
recovery function  r(α,  p ̅) that represents the 
amount paid to creditors as a function of the 
bank’s assets  α and its nominal obligations  p ̅. 
We assume that r is monotone  nondecreasing 
in both of its arguments, and that 
(9)  0 ≤ r(α,  p ̅) ≤ α if  α <  p ̅ 
  r(α,  p ̅) =  p ̅ if  α ≥  p ̅ .
Let  [  p ̅ ij ] be the matrix of nominal payment 
obligations between financial nodes, and 
let  [  p ij (x)] be the matrix of realized pay-
ments between nodes following a shock x. 
As before, let  p i (x) denote the total realized 
payments from i to all other entities includ-
ing the outside sector. The realized value 
of i’s assets equals  ( c i −  x i +  ∑ j   a ji  p j (x)) + , 
hence the clearing condition takes the form
(10)
  p i (x) = r ( ( c i −  x i +  ∑ j 
 
  a ji  p j (x)) + ,  p ̅ i ) . 
Under our assumptions, the mapping 
implied by (10) is monotone  nondecreasing 
in p (although it need not be continuous). 
Hence, Tarski’s theorem implies that at least 
one solution to (10) exists. Specific examples 
of recovery functions and empirical esti-
mates of the amounts recovered in practice 
will be discussed in section 8.7.
5.4 Claims of Different Seniority
The  Eisenberg–Noe model assumes a pro 
rata allocation of payments in case of default. 
In practice, different claims may have differ-
ent seniority. This holds, for example, when 
financial institutions hold equity stakes in 
other financial institutions. These differ from 
debt obligations because they constitute 
residual claims on assets after creditors have 
been paid, and there is no nominal limit to 
how much a claim is worth.  Cross-holdings 
have network spillover effects that can be 
modeled by an extension of the  Eisenberg–
Noe framework that involves solving a nested 
pair of fixed point problems (as in Elsinger 
2009 and related work by Gourieroux, 
Heam, and Monfort 2013). We briefly out-
line the argument here. Let  θ ij ∈ (0, 1) be the 
fraction of bank i’s equity that is owned by 
bank j. Thus j has a claim on the net worth 
of i, provided the latter is nonnegative. This 
constitutes an asset on j’s balance sheet that 
can be used to discharge j’s current debt 
obligations, if needed. To avoid degeneracy, 
let us assume that a positive fraction of each 
bank is owned by the outside sector, that is, 
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the matrix  Θ = [ θ ij ] is strictly row substo-
chastic.7 Given a shock x, let  p ≡ p(x) be the 
resulting payments vector. We may define 
the “interim” net worth of each node i as 
follows:
(11)  ∀ i,   w i (p) 
=  [ c i +  ∑ j 
 
  a ji  p j +  ∑ 
j
 
 
 θ ji ( w j (p)  ∨ 0)] −  p ̅ i . 
The first three terms in (11) represent i’s 
assets, while the last term represents i’s nom-
inal liabilities. (If  w j (p) is negative for some 
j, then i’s equity claim on j is worthless.) It 
can be shown that for every  p ∈ [0,  p ̅] there 
exists a unique vector of net worths  w(p) sat-
isfying (11). Moreover,  w(p) is monotone 
increasing in  p (Elsinger 2009).
To close the model, we need to find a vec-
tor of payments  p ∈ [0,  p ̅] that is a fixed point 
of the mapping
(12)   p = [w(p) +  p ̅] ∧  p ̅. 
Note that (12) involves two fixed points, 
one nested inside the other. Since the fixed 
point  w(p) is monotone nondecreasing in p, a 
solution of (12) always exists, although it need 
not be unique (Elsinger 2009, theorem 1).
5.5 Fire Sales
Network models can be applied to situa-
tions where contagion arises not only through 
payment shortfalls per se, but also from spill-
over effects that arise from common expo-
sures. Suppose, for example, that in order to 
meet capital requirements, a given bank has 
to sell illiquid assets to shore up its balance 
sheet by increasing cash reserves. Suppose 
further that other banks are exposed to the 
7 In other words, each row sum is strictly less than one. 
In fact, it suffices that there is no subgroup of banks all of 
which are completely owned by other banks in the group 
(Elsinger 2009).
same asset. Selling by the first bank puts 
downward pressure on its price, which has 
a negative impact on the balance sheets of 
the other banks, forcing them to raise cash 
as well. The resulting contagion is known 
as a fire sale, and arises when banks are 
exposed to the same asset classes, and value 
their assets at current market prices instead 
of historical costs.8 Duarte and Eisenbach 
(2015) estimate the impact of these effects 
empirically. 
Here we outline a model of this process 
due to Cifuentes et al. (2005). Assume that 
the assets of bank i consist of three parts: 
cash reserves  e i , a quantity of illiquid assets  q i 
whose current price is  θ , and payments from 
other banks  ∑ k≠i   p ki  . Its liabilities consist 
of interbank obligations and obligations to 
depositors. The asset side of the balance 
sheet can be written as follows:
(13)   θ  q i +  e i +  ∑ k≠i   p ki  . 
Suppose that, due to a liquidity shock, bank 
i must increase its cash reserves by selling 
some of its holdings of the illiquid asset. For 
simplicity, let us assume that all banks hold 
the same illiquid asset. (The situation where 
banks have overlapping exposures to multiple 
assets is discussed in section 11). Let  q i ′ ≤  q i 
be the amount that bank i is forced to sell, 
and assume that its price  θ(q′ ) decreases as  q′ 
increases.9 The assets of bank i can now be 
expressed as follows:
(14)  θ(q′ )( q i −  q i ′ ) + ( e i + θ(q′ )  q i ′ ) 
 +  ∑ 
k≠i
 
  p ki ( q ′ ) . 
8 The potentially destabilizing effects of  mark-to-market 
accounting are discussed by Sapra, Plantin, and Shin 
(2008) and Allen and Carletti (2008).
9 Cifuentes et al. (2005) assume that  θ(q′ ) is a negative 
exponential, but a similar analysis holds for many other 
functional forms, as demonstrated in Chen, Liu, and Yao 
(forthcoming).
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The first term is the value of the remaining 
illiquid assets, the second term is the new 
and higher amount of cash reserves, and the 
third term represents the current payments 
from other banks (which may be affected by 
the forced sales). 
Cifuentes et al. (2005) posit a capital 
requirement that forces banks to raise more 
cash the lower the price of the illiquid asset. 
These forced sales further depress the price, 
leading to a downward price spiral and 
 possibly to outright default by some banks. 
Under appropriate regularity conditions, this 
process has an equilibrium set of sales  q ′ and 
payments  p ; the argument is analogous to 
the preceding cases and depends on the fact 
that the price impact function  θ(q′ )  is mono-
tone decreasing in  q′ .
5.6 Mark-to-Market Valuations and Crises 
of Confidence
The preceding examples illustrate how the 
basic logic of the Eisenberg–Noe framework 
can be adapted to model many different 
types and sources of network contagion. In 
this section, we show that a similar frame-
work can be used to model, in reduced form, 
changes in market perceptions about the 
quality of banks’ balance sheets. This frame-
work shows how a decline of confidence in 
the creditworthiness of a particular insti-
tution can spread through the system and 
develop into a general crisis of confidence. 
Consider a directed network on n nodes, 
where each node represents a financial or 
nonfinancial (“outside”) institution, and a 
directed edge  i → j corresponds to a claim 
that node j has on node i. Let  v ̅ ij denote 
the nominal value of such a claim and let  v ij 
denote its current  mark-to-market value, 
where  0 ≤  v ij ≤  v ̅ ij . Let  V =  [ v ij ] 1≤i,j≤n be 
the value matrix. The balance sheet of 
node i consists of the column vector of i’s 
assets,  v ⋅i and the row vector of i’s liabili-
ties,  v i⋅ . Let us posit a function  ϕ i :  R + n →  R + n  
that maps the value of i’s assets to the value 
of its liabilities. We assume that  ϕ i is non-
decreasing and that  0 ≤  ϕ i ( v ⋅i ) ≤  v ̅ ⋅i when-
ever  0 ≤  v ⋅i ≤  v ̅ ⋅i . The matrix V of values is 
consistent if  0 ≤ V ≤  V ̅ and  ϕ i ( v ⋅i ) =  v i⋅ for 
every i. (The existence of such a matrix fol-
lows directly from Tarski’s theorem.)
This framework has direct application to 
situations where contagion is triggered by 
changes in market perceptions about the 
creditworthiness of particular institutions, 
and the values of their assets and liabilities 
are marked to market. Suppose, for exam-
ple, that there is a loss of confidence in the 
balance sheet of a given institution i (as hap-
pened in the case of Lehman Brothers). This 
initial loss of confidence causes a decline in 
the market value of i’s liabilities (as modeled 
by the function  ϕ i ), and thus a decline in the 
asset values of i’s creditors, and hence to a 
general decline in asset values throughout 
the network. Furthermore, these declines 
can lead to the outright default of some insti-
tutions, even though no one defaulted to 
begin with. This application illustrates how 
the basic logic of the  Eisenberg–Noe model 
can be extended to more general sources of 
contagion than those arising from simple 
payment shortfalls. 
6. Systemic Losses and Systemic Risk 
The preceding sections have identified 
various ways in which the financial network 
can amplify shocks that result from pay-
ment shortfalls or declines in asset values. 
What does this framework tell us about the 
contribution of the network to systemic 
risk? There appears to be no accepted defi-
nition of this term in the literature. Roughly 
speaking, it describes the possibility of 
widespread losses in the financial system 
due to shocks that originate in particular 
parts of it. 
The preceding framework suggests sev-
eral ways of measuring the losses triggered 
by such shocks. One is the total loss of bank 
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equity, which is an indicator of the ability 
of the financial sector to extend credit (see, 
for example, Cont, Moussa, and Santos 
2013). Another measure is the aggregate 
loss inflicted on the nonfinancial sector, 
that is, the total shortfall in payments from 
the financial sector to households and non-
financial firms. Yet a third and more com-
prehensive measure is the total loss in asset 
values summed over all entities in the sys-
tem. We shall call this the systemic loss in 
value. Using the notation introduced in sec-
tion 5.6, this is the total amount by which 
the value of all claims—including interbank 
claims and claims by households and non-
financial institutions on the financial sec-
tor—are reduced relative to their nominal 
values:10
(15)  L =  ∑ 
0≤i,j≤n
 
 
 ( 
_
 v ij −  v ij ) . 
In the setting where values are identified 
with clearing payments, the loss is the total 
amount by which payments are reduced as 
the result of an exogenous shock. Specifically, 
suppose that  x = ( x 1 , .  .  . ,  x n ) represents a 
shock to the outside assets of the n financial 
nodes and  p ̅ = ( p ̅ 1 , .  .  . ,  p ̅n ) represents the 
nominal payments due from these nodes to 
each other and to the external sector. Let  p(x) 
be the resulting clearing vector. Then
(16)  L = L(x) =  ∑ 
1≤i≤n
 
 
  x i +  ∑ 
1≤i≤n
 
 
 ( 
_
 pi −  p i (x)) .
The first term in (15) is the direct loss in 
asset values by the financial sector, while 
the second term is the indirect loss in val-
ues due to reduced payments to both the 
financial and nonfinancial sectors. (Recall 
that  p i (x) represents i’s total payments to 
all entities.) This measure treats losses on 
10 A variant of this idea was proposed in Glasserman and 
Young (2015).
interbank obligations in the same way that it 
treats losses on obligations between financial 
and nonfinancial actors. As the discussion 
in section 3 shows, contractual obligations 
between financial firms play a critical role 
in managing liquidity needs, intermediating 
between lenders and borrowers, and diver-
sifying risk exposures. These obligations can 
be thought of as intermediate goods that 
have economic value to the contracting par-
ties, and thus their impairment corresponds 
to genuine economic losses. 
In addition, financial losses have other 
consequences for the real economy. Credit 
is less available for funding new invest-
ment projects; moreover, existing invest-
ments may have to be liquidated early in 
order to meet  short-term obligations, thus 
leading to inefficiencies. Second, bank-
ruptcy carries significant administrative 
and legal costs (a topic we shall return to 
in section 8). Third, financial losses have an 
impact on household balance sheets, with 
consequent reductions in consumption and 
underutilization of productive capacity in 
the economy at large. Although there has 
been some research attempting to quantify 
these effects,11 much remains to be done 
in pinning down the relationship between 
financial losses and the resulting reduction 
in economic welfare. 
Finally, we should emphasize that uncer-
tainty in shock sizes creates uncertainty in 
losses. In other words, we should think of 
a systemic loss measure as having a prob-
ability distribution, and it is important to 
understand how the network of financial 
obligations transforms a distribution of ini-
tial shocks into a distribution of  system-wide 
losses. Such a framework will be discussed in 
the next two sections.
11 See, among others, Gertler and Kyotaki (2010); 
Adrian and Boyarchenko (2012); Chen, Iyengar, and 
Moallemi (2013); Bassett et al. (2014); and Brunnermeier 
and Sannikov (2014).
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7. Measures of Vulnerability and 
Contagion
We turn first to the problem of assessing 
the potential contagiousness of different 
banks given their individual characteris-
tics—such as size, leverage, and asset qual-
ity—as well as their position in the financial 
network. Although there is a growing liter-
ature on the susceptibility of different net-
work topologies to contagion, much of this 
literature does not separate the impact of 
the topology from differences in balance 
sheet characteristics that make some banks 
inherently more contagious than others. In 
this section we shall focus on how to measure 
the inherent contagiousness of a bank, and 
the inherent vulnerability of a bank to con-
tagion, using just individual balance sheet 
information about each. It turns out that 
some useful conclusions can be drawn from 
 individual-level data without knowing the 
details of the banks’ position in the network 
or the probability distribution that governs 
shocks to their assets. These topics will be 
taken up in subsequent sections.
7.1 Pairwise Measures
To fix ideas, let us begin by focusing on a 
particular pair of banks, i and j, one of which 
has obligations to the other. Assume further 
that  w i ,  w j > 0 . They are embedded in a 
larger network, the details of which are left 
unspecified (see figure 6).
Let  X i ∈ [0,  c i ] be a random shock with 
realization  X i =  x i that reduces the value of i’s 
outside assets to  c i −  x i and its net worth to 
 w i −  x i . (Note that the latter may be negative.) 
The amount of the loss that spills over onto j 
is  a ij  ( x i −  w i ) + , which reduces j’s net worth. 
In particular i’s default triggers j’s default if
(17)   a ij  ( x i −  w i ) + >  w j . 
Recalling that  x i is at most  c i , we can measure 
j’s vulnerability to i by the ratio
(18)  a ij ( c i −  w i )/ w j =  a ij ( λ i − 1) w i / w j , 
ci – xi
wi
i j
pÿ
wj
Figure 6. Node i Owes  
_
 p ij to Node j
Note: The outside assets of node i are hit by a shock  x i ≤  c i .
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where λi = ci/wi is i’s outside leverage. If the 
ratio in (18) is less than unity, then j is rela-
tively immune to a shock from i. Note that 
this condition does not guarantee complete 
immunity, because simultaneously j might be 
weakened by shocks to its own outside assets 
or by shocks transmitted from nodes other 
than i. Furthermore, a shock to node i could 
ripple through the financial network, trigger-
ing a cascade of defaults that eventually take 
out node j. In this sense, the criterion in (18) 
is only a  first-order measure of vulnerability 
that does not take into account the transmis-
sion of one or more shocks in the full net-
work. This situation will be considered in 
more detail in section 8.
We can rewrite the relative immunity 
condition as follows. Recall that  a ij =  p ̅ ij / p ̅ i . 
Hence, j is relatively immune to a shock 
from i if  p ̅ ij ( λ i − 1)/ w j <  p ̅ i / w i . The total 
leverage of i (its assets divided by its net 
worth) equals  λ i ⁎ = ( p ̅ i +  w i )/ w i . Clearly  λ i ⁎  is at least as great as i’s outside leverage,  λ i  . It 
follows from (18) that j is relatively immune 
to a shock from i if
(19)   p ̅ ij / w j < ( λ i ⁎ − 1)/( λ i  − 1) . 
This measure is related to a test of j’s vulner-
ability that has been put forth by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (2014) 
through its “large exposure limit.” Consider 
j’s maximum exposure to any given counter-
party divided by j’s net worth:
(20)   max i   p ̅ ij / w j . 
If this ratio is less than unity, the only way 
that j can default is if more than one of its 
creditor banks fails completely and/or j suf-
fers substantial shocks to its own assets, thus 
reducing its net worth. In fact, the Basel 
Committee’s large exposure limit caps a 
bank’s exposure to any single counterparty 
at 25 percent of the bank’s tier one capi-
tal; for global systemically important banks 
( G-SIBs), a more stringent cap of 15 percent 
has been proposed (Basel Committee 2014).
7.2 General Measures: Financial 
Connectivity and the Contagion Index
This approach can be extended to mea-
sure the potential vulnerability of subsets of 
nodes to the default of a single node. Define 
the financial connectivity of node i,  β i , to be 
the fraction of i’s obligations that are owed to 
the financial sector, that is,  β i = ( p ̅ i −  b i )/ p ̅ i . 
This number is of fundamental importance 
in assessing the extent to which i contrib-
utes to systemic risk, as we shall see in sub-
sequent sections. For the moment, let us 
consider how it can be used to assess vul-
nerability and contagion in a partial setting 
without specifying the details of the network 
or the distribution of shocks. Fix a node i and 
a subset of nodes S that does not include i. 
When can a shock to i’s outside assets cause 
all the nodes in S to default purely through 
network spillover effects (including spill-
overs from intermediate nodes), but without 
any further amplification from bankruptcy 
costs? Evidently this is impossible if
(21)   ∑ 
j∈S
 
  w j >  w i  β i ( λ i − 1) . 
The  right-hand side of (21) is called i’s con-
tagion index (Glasserman and Young 2015). 
A bank with a high contagion index poses 
a systemic risk in the sense that it is more 
susceptible to failure (due to high leverage), 
its failure has large consequences (due to its 
size), and its failure has a potentially large 
impact on the rest of the financial system 
(due to its high financial connectivity).
8. Shock Distributions
The preceding analysis of default cas-
cades is based on  worst-case scenarios and 
does not assume an underlying shock distri-
bution. In this section we introduce shock 
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distributions explicitly in order to study the 
likelihood of default cascades and the losses 
that they generate. Let  F( x 1   ,  x 2   , .  .  . ,  x n   ) be a 
joint c.d.f. of shocks to the outside assets of 
the various nodes in the financial system. In 
practice, these shocks may be positively cor-
related due to common exposures, and thus 
the probability of multiple bank failures will 
generally be higher than if the shocks were 
independently distributed. Note, however, 
that systemic risk from common exposures 
and correlated shocks is present whether or 
not the banks are interconnected. To address 
the question of how much the financial net-
work amplifies systemic losses, we will first 
consider the case of independent shocks. It 
turns out that many of these estimates are 
also valid for the case of correlated shocks.
8.1 Beta Distributions
To be specific, let us assume that the 
shocks to the various nodes are independent 
and the size of the shock  x i is proportional to 
the value of the outside assets  c i . In this case 
we can write
(22)   F( x 1   ,  x 2   , .  .  . ,  x n   ) =  ∏ 
i
 H i ( x i / c i ) , 
where  H i (y) is a c.d.f. with domain  y ∈ [0, 1] . 
A particularly convenient and flexible family 
of distributions are the monotone beta distri-
butions of form
(23)   H i (y) = 1 −  (1 − y)  q i  ,  q i ≥ 1.  
The parameter  q i can be interpreted as 
an asset quality index: the larger the value 
of  q i , the smaller the expected loss and the 
variance of the losses.12 Beta distributions 
can be used to approximate more complex 
distributions, such as the Gaussian copula 
12 The expected loss is  1/(1 +  q i ) and the variance is 
 1/(2 +  q i )  (1 +  q i ) 2 , both of which are monotone decreas-
ing in  q i . 
model that is used for setting Basel capital 
requirements. The Gaussian copula model 
describes the distribution of losses in a loan 
portfolio using two parameters—an average 
probability of default PD, and a parameter 
ρ describing the correlation between loans,
(24)  F(x) = Φ (  √ 
____
 1 − ρ  Φ −1 (x) −  Φ −1 (PD)  _______________ √ __ ρ ) . 
Figure 7 compares the Gaussian copula with 
PD = 0.05 and ρ = 0.13 with the monotone 
beta distribution when  q i = 19 .
The probability that i defaults due to 
losses on its outside assets is given by the 
expression 
(25)  δ i = P( X i >  w i ) = 1 −  H i (1/ λ i ) . 
In the case of monotone beta distributions, 
we therefore obtain the following simple 
formula relating leverage  λ i , asset quality  q i , 
and probability of default  δ i :
(26)   δ i =  (1 − 1 / λ i )  q i  . 
8.2 Estimating the Probability of Default 
Cascades
We now employ this framework to esti-
mate the probability of default cascades. 
To keep matters simple, we shall continue 
to assume (for the time being) that there is 
no amplification due to other mechanisms 
such as bankruptcy costs or common expo-
sures. These will be discussed in subsequent 
sections.
Consider the simple chain of obligations 
shown in figure 8. To be concrete, we can 
think of A as a mortgage company whose 
assets consist of outstanding mortgages to 
households worth 100, and whose liabilities 
consist of  short-term loans from investment 
bank B worth 95. Thus A’s net worth is 5. 
Bank B has liabilities of 60 to outside deposi-
tors and 30 in obligations to bank C, so its net 
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Figure 7. Comparison of Beta Distribution and Gaussian Copula Distribution
Note: Densities for beta with c.d.f.  F(x) = 1 −  (1 − x ) 19 and the Gaussian copula distribution with probabil-
ity of default PD = 0.05 and  ρ = 0.13.
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Figure 8. A Chain of Obligations
Note: The net worth of each node is in bold.
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worth is also 5. Bank C owes 49 to depositors 
and is owed 20 by nonfinancial firms so its 
net worth is 1.
Suppose that node A suffers a loss that is 
large enough to knock out B. Then A must 
lose its net worth of 5 plus B’s net worth of 5. 
By assumption, the probability that A loses 
at least 5 is  δ A =  (1 − 5/100) q , where  q ≥ 1 
depends on the quality of A’s assets. Although 
we do not know the value of q, we do know 
that whenever  a > 1 and  0 < b < 1 the fol-
lowing inequality holds:  (1 − b) a > 1 − ab . 
If  ab < 1 we can conclude that 
 (1 − ab) q <  (1 − b) aq for all q > 0. There-
fore, the probability that A loses enough to 
topple B is  (1 − 10/100) q <  δ A 2 . Under nor-
mal conditions, we would expect  δ A to be 
small, say less than 1 percent. Thus, even 
though we do not know the value of q, we 
can deduce that it is highly improbable that 
A’s losses will be enough to topple B unless 
there is loss amplification from other sources.
Next, let us consider the probability that 
A loses enough to knock out both B and C. 
Clearly it suffices that A lose at least 13: it 
takes a loss of 10 to topple A and B, plus 
another 3 to knock out C. (Note that only 
 one-third of B’s losses spill over onto C’s 
balance sheet, because only  one-third of B’s 
obligations are to C.) The probability of this 
event is  (1 − 13/100) q <  δ A 2.6 , which again is 
very small under normal conditions. 
Of course there may be times, such as 
the  run-up to the crisis in  2007–08, when 
 risk-taking behavior leads to elevated proba-
bilities of default at the individual bank level, 
in which case  δ A may not be particularly 
small. However, the point of the preceding 
analysis is not to estimate the probability 
of network spillovers in an absolute sense, 
but to illustrate how they compare to the 
probability of direct default by individual 
banks. We should also emphasize that this 
is a partial analysis that does not account 
for simultaneous shocks to the assets of 
different nodes in the network, nor does 
it account for cascades that might emerge 
from other parts of the network. In the next 
few sections, we examine how to estimate 
the systemic impact from all of these effects 
taken together.
8.3 Estimating Systemic Losses
As we have argued earlier, a comprehen-
sive measure of systemic impact is the decline 
in asset values across the entire system, that 
is, the systemic loss in value defined in sec-
tion 6. To illustrate this concept consider 
again the example in figure 8. Suppose that 
node A suffers a loss of 25 on payments from 
its  mortgage-holders. Then A’s payment to B 
is reduced from 95 to 75, and B’s payment 
to C is reduced from 30 to 25. Furthermore 
B’s depositors lose 10 and C’s depositors lose 
4. Thus in this example the systemic loss in 
value caused by A’s default is 25 + 20 + 5 + 
10 + 4 = 64. The network amplifies the ini-
tial shock by partially destroying the value of 
a whole series of obligations between finan-
cial actors. In this section we shall show how 
to bound the expected loss in value when rel-
atively little information about the network 
topology is available.
For simplicity, we shall employ the pay-
ments framework of Eisenberg and Noe. As 
in figure 2, each financial node i has nom-
inal outside assets  c i , nominal outside obli-
gations  b i , and nominal obligations to other 
nodes  p ̅ ij ,  j ≠ i . Suppose that the outside 
assets of the various nodes are simultaneously 
hit by nonnegative shocks  x = ( x 1 , .  .  . ,  x n )  with cumulative distribution function F(x). 
Unlike in previous sections, we shall not 
require that the shocks be independent.
Let D(x) denote the set of nodes that default 
given x. Our standing assumption is that from 
every node there exists a chain of obligations 
that leads to the outside sector, so the clear-
ing vector  p(x) is unique (see section 5). The 
resulting shortfall in payments by node i is
(27)   s i (x) =  p ̅ i −  p i (x) . 
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In particular  s i (x) > 0 for all  i ∈ D(x) 
and  s i (x) = 0 for all  i ∉ D(x) . In this setting 
the systemic loss in value as defined in (16) 
can be written as follows:
(28) 
 
L(x) =  ∑ 
i
 
 
 x i +  ∑ 
i
 
 
 s i (x) . 
The first term,  ∑ i    x i , is the direct loss in value 
from reductions in payments by the outside 
sector to the financial sector. The second 
term,  ∑ i    s i (x) , is the indirect loss in value 
due to reductions in payments by financial 
entities to one another and also to the out-
side sector.
Note that the reduction in payments to 
the outside sector can be expressed in the 
form  ∑ (1 −  β i )  s i (x) , where  β i ∈ [0, 1] is i’s 
financial connectivity.13
Let  A D be the  |D| ×  |D| matrix obtained 
by restricting the relative liabilities matrix A 
to  D = D(x) . Let  I D be the  |D| ×  |D| identity 
matrix. Similarly, let  w D be the vector of ini-
tial net worths of the nodes in D and let  s D  be the vector of shortfalls. The following short-
fall equation follows directly from (27) and 
the fact that p is a clearing vector:
(29)  s D  A D − ( w D −  x D ) =  s D . 
The logic of this equation can be seen as fol-
lows. For each defaulting node,   i ∈ D,  [ s D  A D ] i 
represents the incoming shortfall in pay-
ments to i from other nodes. These shortfalls 
are offset by i’s initial net worth  w i and they 
are augmented by the direct shock  x i .
Under our hypotheses, there is a positive 
chain of obligations from every financial node 
to some node that has positive obligations to 
the external sector. Hence the spectral radius 
13 Recall that the financial connectivity  β i of node i is 
the fraction of i’s liabilities owed to other entities in the 
financial sector, and 1 −  β i is the fraction owed to non-
financial entities. 
of  A D is less than unity, so  lim k→∞   A D 
k → 0 . It 
follows that  I D −  A D   is invertible and
(30)   [ I D −  A D   ] −1 =  I D +  A D +  A D 2 + ⋯ 
8.4 Node Depth
We now introduce a topological measure 
called node depth that plays a key role in 
the analysis of systemic risk. Intuitively, the 
node depth measures the extent to which 
each additional dollar of loss at a given node 
becomes amplified as it cascades through 
the network, causing additional losses at 
other nodes. Consider a Markov chain on 
the default set D with probability transi-
tion matrix  A D . Given  i ∈ D compute the 
expected number of periods  u i  that it takes to exit D starting from i. Let  u i = 0 for 
all  i ∉ D . We shall call  u i the depth of node i 
in D. Recalling that D and u depend on the 
shock vector x, we can write
(31)  ∀ i ∈ D(x),
 u i (x) = [ I D(x) +  A D(x) +  A D(x) 2 + ⋯] ⋅  1 D(x) 
 ∀ i ∉ D(x),    u i (x) = 0 .
From the definition of L(x) and (29)–(31) it 
follows that the systemic loss given a shock x 
is given by the expression
(32)   L(x) =  ∑ 
i
 
 
 x i +  ∑ 
i
 
 
( x i −  w i )  u i (x) . 
Thus we see that the node depths 
 u D = [ I D +  A D +  A D 2 + ⋯] ·  1 D measure the 
amplification of losses due to interconnec-
tions among financial entities. This concept 
is related to the notion of eigenvector cen-
trality in the networks literature, as we shall 
see in section 9.
For the present, let us illustrate the con-
cept of node depth with a couple of exam-
ples. Suppose that all three nodes in figure 8 
default. The depth of the last node in the chain 
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is  u C = 1 because the probability of exiting to 
the external sector equals one. The number 
of periods to exit from node B is 1 with prob-
ability 1/2 and  1 +  u C = 2 with probability 
1/2, hence the depth of node B is  u B = 1.5 . 
Finally the depth of A is one more than the 
depth of B, hence  u A = 1 +  u B = 2.5 .
In similar fashion, one can compute the 
node depths for the example in figure 3. Let 
us assume that all nodes default. Then the 
transition probabilities together with the 
node depths are as shown in figure 9. Since 
the node depths are monotonically increas-
ing with the default set, these are upper 
bounds on the node depths with respect to 
any subset of defaulting nodes.
8.5 Bounding the Node Depths
We can derive a useful lower bound on 
the amount of amplification by adapting a 
concept from the social networks  literature 
called “cohesiveness” (Morris 2000). A set 
of nodes D is  α-cohesive if  ∑ j∈D    a ij ≥ α 
for every  i ∈ D , that is, every node in D 
has at least α of its obligations to other nodes 
in D. The cohesiveness of D is the maximum 
such α, which we denote by  α D . Evidently 
the probability of exiting the set D in any 
given period is at most  1 −  α D . This yields 
the lower bound
(33)  ∀ i ∈ D,   u i ≥  (1 −  α D ) −1 .
It follows that the more cohesive the default 
set, the greater the depth of the nodes in 
the default set and the greater the potential 
amplification of an initial shock.
Using (32), we can bound the systemic 
loss L(x) by bounding the node depths from 
above. Recall that node i’s financial con-
nectivity  β i is the proportion of i’s obliga-
tions to other nodes in the financial system. 
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Figure 9. Transition Probabilities and Node Depths for the Example in Figure 3
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Let  β D = max { β i : i ∈ D} . The probability 
of exiting D in any period is at least  1 −  β D , 
hence
(34)  ∀ i ∈ D,  u i ≤  (1 −  β D ) −1 . 
In practice, the default set D will depend 
on the shocks and on the topology of the 
network that transmits the shocks, neither 
of which may be known. Nevertheless, one 
can derive a useful upper bound on the 
node depths with virtually no information 
about the network or the shocks. Namely, 
let  β + =  max 1≤i≤n  β i be the maximum finan-
cial connectivity among all nodes. Then the 
node depths satisfy the uniform upper bound
(35)  ∀ i,    u i ≤  (1 −  β + ) −1 . 
The number  1 −  β + is a lower bound on the 
rate at which losses in the financial system 
are dissipated to the outside sector. For some 
banking systems, this bound can be estimated 
from publicly available data. Glasserman and 
Young (2015) estimate the financial connec-
tivities of ninety large European banks using 
European Banking Authority stress test 
data, under the assumption that the frac-
tion of  in-network liabilities is the same as 
the fraction of  in-network assets. The esti-
mated connectivities range from 0.021 to 
0.43, with a median value of 0.119. In this 
case,  β + = 0.43 , hence none of the node 
depths can exceed 1/(1 − 0.43) = 1.76. 
Allahrakha, Glasserman, and Young (2015) 
estimate somewhat lower connectivities for 
the largest US bank-holding companies.
8.6 Bounding Systemic Loss
Although the systemic loss in 
value  L(x) clearly depends on the topology 
of the network and on the specific shock 
vector x, we claim that the expected systemic 
loss  ∫ L(x) dF(x) can be bounded for a wide 
range of shock distributions with minimal 
information about the network topology. 
The idea is to compare the expected sys-
temic losses in the presence of the network, 
with the expected systemic losses when all 
network connections are severed and the 
balance sheets of the various nodes are held 
fixed. We can create a similar financial sys-
tem with no interconnections as follows: as 
before, each node i has outside assets  c i and 
outside liabilities  b i . To keep their net worths 
fixed as we sever connections, we introduce 
fictitious assets and liabilities. In particular, 
if  w i >  c i −  b i , we give i a new class of out-
side assets in the amount  c i ′ =  w i − ( c i −  b i ) ; 
if  w i <  c i −  b i , we give i a new class of outside 
liabilities in the amount  b i ′ =  c i −  b i −  w i . 
It is assumed that these fictitious assets are 
impervious to shocks, while the original 
 outside assets are subject to the same shock 
distribution as before.
We illustrate the idea in figure 10 using the 
example in figure 3. Consider node A. It still 
has its original outside assets (worth 120) and 
its original outside liabilities (worth 180). Its 
original  in-network assets were 250 in pay-
ments due from nodes C and D: these have 
been aggregated into a fictitious asset worth 
250. Similarly, its original  in-network liability 
(a payment of 180 due to node B) has become 
a fictitious asset worth 180. The entries for the 
other nodes are derived in similar fashion.
Given a shock vector x let  L(x) =  ∑ i    x i + 
 ∑ i    s i (x) denote the systemic loss in the orig-
inal interconnected system. In the corre-
sponding severed system, the systemic loss is 
simply the sum of the initial shocks plus the 
shortfall in payments from defaulting nodes 
to the outside sector:
(36)   L o (x) =  ∑ 
i
 
 
 x i +  ∑ 
i
 
 
( x i −  w i ) + . 
The systemic impact of the network can 
be defined as the ratio  L ̅ / L ̅ o − 1 , where 
L ̅ = E [L(x)] and  L ̅ o = E[ L o (x)] .
One can bound the systemic impact 
of the network for a wide range of shock 
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 distributions as follows. Let  F(  x 1   ,  x 2   , .  .  . ,  x n   ) 
be the joint distribution of outside shocks. 
We assume that the shocks are identi-
cally distributed and homogeneous in the 
underlying assets, that is,  F( x 1   ,  x 2   , .  .  . ,  x n   ) = G( x 1 / c 1 , .  .  . ,  x n / c n ) for a c.d.f.  G  with 
domain  [0, 1] n . We do not need to assume that 
the shocks are independent. Let  G i ( y i ) be the 
 marginal distribution of  G with respect to i, 
where   y i ∈ [0, 1] , and let  g i (y) be its density. 
We say that  G has an increasing fail-
ure rate (IFR) if  g i ( y i )/(1 −  G i ( y i )) is an 
increasing function for every i. Examples 
of IFR distributions include the normal, 
exponential, monotone beta with  q ≥ 1 , 
and all  log-concave distributions.
The probability that i defaults directly can 
be expressed as follows:
(37)   δ i = P( x i >  w i ) = 1 −  G i ( w i / c i ) .
PROPOSITION 1.14 If the joint shock dis-
tribution is homogeneous in assets and IFR, 
then the expected systemic loss in value is 
bounded as follows:
(38)  L ̅ / L ̅ o − 1 ≤   ∑  δ i  c i   ________ 
(1 −  β + )  ∑  c i  . 
14  This result is proved in Glasserman and Young 
(2015) for a slightly different loss function, namely,  L ̃ (x) 
=  ∑ i   ( x i ∧  w i ) +  ∑ i    s i (x) . In fact proposition 1 holds under 
either definition of systemic loss.
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Figure 10. Example of Figure 3 with Interbank Connections Severed and Balance Sheets Held Fixed by the 
Introduction of Fictitious Assets and Liabilities (in Bold)
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The  right-hand side of (38) will typically be 
small if the direct default probabilities δi are 
small. Suppose, for example, that all finan-
cial institutions are alike in the sense that 
they have the same quantity and quality of 
outside assets, and the same probability of 
direct default,  δ . Then (39) implies that the 
relative increase in expected systemic losses 
due to network effects is at most  δ/(1 −  β + ) . 
If the financial institutions are not alike, the 
expression highlights which of them contrib-
ute most to systemic risk: namely, those that 
have a large base of outside assets and/or 
a high probability of default. Another way 
of thinking about expression (38) is that 
it captures the interaction between key 
microprudential variables (the  δ i ) and the 
macroprudential variable  β + , which mea-
sures financial connectivity at the systemic 
level.
8.7 The Amplification Effect of Bankruptcy 
Costs
Up to this point, we have made the simpli-
fying assumption that when a bank defaults, 
its remaining assets are distributed pro rata 
without further impairment by the resolu-
tion process itself. This assumption is clearly 
unrealistic. Unfortunately, there is relatively 
little empirical work on how large the impair-
ments are in practice, nor is there much 
agreement on how to model the amount of 
impairment as a function of fundamentals. 
We see this as a crucial topic where more 
research is needed. Here we shall highlight 
the main components of bankruptcy costs, 
and suggest alternative ways of modeling 
them.
Broadly speaking, the costs associated 
with default may be divided into three cat-
egories: administrative and legal costs, the 
costs of delay in making payments, and 
 markdowns in the valuation of assets in 
order to sell them quickly and reduce delays 
in making payments. In practice, it is diffi-
cult to distinguish between liquidation costs 
and unrealized losses that occurred prior to 
failure.15 From a modeling perspective, the 
distinction is between a loss due to an initial 
shock and an amplification that results from 
bankruptcy costs. 
Bennett and Unal (2014) estimate the legal 
and administrative costs of bank resolutions 
using FDIC data over the period  1986–2007. 
For the largest twenty-five banks in the sam-
ple, these costs ranged from 0.33 percent to 
13.19 percent of the book value of the bank’s 
assets at the time of failure, and the median 
value was 5.69 percent.16 The losses could 
be even greater (as a percentage of assets) 
when a large and complex institution fails in 
a disorderly manner, as occurred in the case 
of Lehman.17
We now turn to the question of how to 
model bankruptcy costs theoretically. In 
other words, when a bank’s assets are worth 
less than its obligations, what portion of the 
assets’ value is eventually recovered by cred-
itors and what portion is lost through the 
resolution process? Recall from section 5.3 
that the recovery function  r(α,  p ̅)  represents 
the amount paid to creditors as a function of 
the bank’s assets  α and its nominal obliga-
tions  p ̅. As before, we assume that  r(α,  p ̅) is 
monotone nondecreasing in both arguments 
and that  0 ≤ r(α,  p ̅) ≤ α when  α <  p ̅ and 
 r(α,  p ̅) =  p ̅ when  α ≥  p ̅. The deadweight 
loss is  α − r(α,  p ̅) , which is the difference 
between the assets available and the amount 
distributed to creditors. 
15 An asset may lose value prior to the failure of a 
bank, but the loss is realized only when the asset is sold or 
acquired. James (1991) provides estimates of these effects.
16 Bennett and Unal (2014), table 2, direct expenses dis-
counted plus receivership expenses discounted.
17 Fleming and Sarkar (2014) estimate that Lehman’s 
creditors recovered 28 percent of what they were owed. 
This loss rate reflects both unrealized losses prior to bank-
ruptcy and additional losses due to the bankruptcy itself, 
but they note that the abruptness of the bankruptcy may 
have substantially reduced the value of the Lehman estate.
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Rogers and Veraart (2013) propose a dis-
continuous recovery function such that for 
some  θ < 1 , 
(39)  r(α,  p ̅) = θα whenever  0 ≤ α <  p ̅, 
(40)  r(α,  p ̅) =  p ̅ whenever  α ≥  p ̅. 
Elliott et al. (2014) suggest that when  α is 
sufficiently close to  p ̅ there is full recov-
ery of the available assets, but when  α falls 
below a critical threshold the recovery rate 
 r(α,  p ̅) drops discontinuously. Glasserman 
and Young (2015) propose a model in which 
the amount of unrecovered assets increases 
linearly in the gap between the assets and the 
liabilities, that is,  α − r(α,  p ̅) = γ( p ̅ − α) for 
some  γ > 0 . Taking into account the fact 
that  r(α,  p ̅) must be nonnegative, this leads 
to a linear recovery function of form
(41)  r(α,  p ̅) = ((1 + γ) α − γ   p ̅) ∧ 0 . 
Various functional forms are illustrated in 
figure 11. We remark that even if the recov-
ery function  r(α, p ̅) is nonlinear, the for-
mulation in (41) provides a useful way of 
bounding the expected losses from above. In 
particular it suffices to find a value of  γ such 
that the function  (1 + γ)α − γ   p ̅ bounds the 
rate of recovery from below (see the dashed 
lines in figure 11). The extreme case of zero 
recovery at default corresponds to an infinite 
γ and can be approximated by a large finite γ.
We now show how to incorporate bank-
ruptcy costs into the previous framework. 
Consider a recovery function that is bounded 
below by a linear function with slope 1 + γ:
(42)   r(α,  p ̅) ≥ ((1 + γ)α − γ   p ̅) ∧ 0 . 
Let x be a shock vector and let D = D(x) be 
the resulting default set. A derivation similar 
to (29) shows that the shortfalls at the nodes 
in D satisfy the inequality
(43)   (1 + γ)[ s D  A D −  w D +  x D ] ≥  s D . 
Suppose in addition that  (1 + γ)  A D has 
spectral radius less than one, in which 
case  I D − (1 + γ)  A D is invertible. Define the 
modified node depth vector as follows
(44)  u D (γ)
= [ I D + (1 + γ) A D +  (1 + γ) 2  A D 2 + ⋯]·  1 D . 
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Figure 11. Three Models of the Recovery Function
Note: Left panel: discontinuous and piecewise linear. Middle panel: continuous and nonlinear. Right panel: 
continuous and linear. In the left and middle panels, the dashed lines bound the rate of recovery from below.
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Then the  system-wide shortfall satisfies the 
upper bound
(45)  ∑ 
i
 
 
 s i (x) ≤  s D ·  u D (γ) 
 = (1 + γ) ( x D −  w D )·  u D (γ) . 
This in turn provides an upper bound on the 
systemic loss in value  L(x) =  ∑ i    x i +  ∑ i    s i (x) .
These bounds depend on the matrix  A D , 
which depends on the structure of the default 
set D, which depends in turn on the shock 
vector x. In practice, it is difficult to esti-
mate these quantities with any precision. 
We do know, however, that the node depths 
are bounded above by the node depths 
that result when D is the set of all nodes. 
As before, let  β + =  max i  β i and suppose 
that  (1 + γ)  β + < 1 . Then the node depths 
are uniformly bounded above as follows:
(46)   ∀ i,    u i ≤  (1 − (1 + γ)  β + ) −1 . 
In analogy with proposition 1, one can then 
bound the expected systemic losses attribut-
able to the network as follows.
PROPOSITION 2. Suppose that the joint 
shock distribution  F(x) is homogeneous in 
assets and IFR. Suppose further that the 
amount recovered in default is bounded 
below by the linear recovery function with 
slope 1 + γ. If  (1 + γ)  β + < 1 , the expected 
systemic loss in value relative to the expected 
loss with no network connections is bounded 
as follows:
(47)  L ̅ / L ̅ o − 1 ≤   ∑  δ i  c i    _________________  
(1 − (1 + γ)  β + )  ∑  c i  . 
We can interpret the product  (1 + γ)  β + as 
a critical threshold that differentiates two 
regimes: when it is less than unity, the ampli-
fication of losses due to spillover effects is 
more than offset by the dissipation of these 
losses to the outside sector; when  (1 + γ)  β + 
is greater than unity, the losses within the 
financial system can escalate dramatically. As 
we have emphasized throughout this section, 
the bound in (47) uses information about 
individual nodes in the network, but it does 
not assume detailed knowledge of the net-
work topology.
9. Network Measures
Whereas the economics literature on 
financial networks has often focused on sim-
ple configurations—ring networks and fully 
connected networks—a line of research 
drawing on network science has studied 
the features of actual networks, which are 
much more complex. One goal of this line of 
work is to identify simple network features 
that describe the vulnerability of a network 
or part of a network. We will review work 
applying these ideas to interbank networks 
defined through payment obligations.
To discuss network measures, we need to 
introduce some notation and terminology. 
A network has a set of nodes {1, … , N} and 
edges that connect pairs of nodes. The net-
work’s N × N adjacency matrix B is defined 
by setting Bij = 1 if an edge connects nodes 
i and j and Bij = 0, otherwise. In a directed 
network, each edge has a direction. In this 
case, Bij = 1 indicates the presence of an 
edge running from node i to node j. In most 
financial networks, each edge has a weight 
as well as a direction. In particular, in pre-
vious sections we defined financial networks 
through a matrix  
_
 P = [ _ p ij ] of liabilities, in 
which  
_
 pij ≥ 0 denotes the amount node i 
owes to node j, as in figure 2. We interpret 
these as gross amounts, so both  
_
 pij   and  
_
 pji 
may be positive. Both the liabilities matrix _
 P and the adjacency matrix B have zeros on 
their diagonals.
9.1 Degree Distributions
Empirical descriptions of networks fre-
quently include information about degree 
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distributions. In a directed network, a node’s 
 in-degree is the number of edges directed to 
that node, and the  out-degree is the number 
of edges directed from that node. These are 
given, respectively, by the column sums and 
row sums of the adjacency matrix B. In an 
undirected network, a node’s degree is the 
number of edges connected to that node. 
The degree distribution is just the empirical 
distribution of degrees across the nodes in a 
network.
Across many types of networks (including 
social networks and the Internet, for exam-
ple), one often finds that a power law (a dis-
tribution with a  Pareto-like tail) describes 
the degree distribution. In their analysis of 
the Austrian interbank lending network, 
Boss et al. (2004) estimate power laws for 
the distributions of  in-degree,  out-degree, 
and total degree. Their estimates are based 
on partial network information and a method 
for imputing unobserved links, to which we 
return in section 12. They also find a power 
law in the distribution of imputed interbank 
liabilities. Similar conclusions can be found 
in Santos and Cont (2010) and Cont, Moussa, 
and Santos (2013) for the Brazilian interbank 
network, in  Martinez-Jaramillo et al. (2014) 
for the Mexican banking system. Power law 
degree distributions are also documented in 
the Japanese and US payment systems by 
Inaoka et al. (2004) and Soramaki et al. (2007), 
respectively. Fricke and Lux (2013) challenge 
findings of power laws in interbank networks 
using data on overnight interbank lending in 
Europe. They find that parameter estimates 
for fitted power laws are unstable over time, 
and they conclude that distributions with an 
exponential tail often provide a better fit.
What do these findings tell us about inter-
bank networks? Leaving aside the question 
of the precise decay rates of degree distribu-
tions, at least two observations seem robust. 
First, degree distributions in interbank net-
works are highly skewed: most banks have few 
links, and a few banks have a large number of 
links. Second, there is substantial asymmetry 
between  in-degree and  out-degree distribu-
tions (as observed, in particular, by Bech and 
Atalay 2010 and Puhr, Seliger, and Sigmund 
2012): when a bank is highly connected, it 
is usually because it borrows from many 
other banks and not because it lends to many 
other banks. Pritsker (2013) offers a support-
ing theory for these patterns, to which we 
return in section 12. The dynamic model of 
Blasques, Bräuning, and van Lelyveld (2015) 
generates networks of interbank relation-
ship lending with these features, which the 
authors attribute to credit risk uncertainty 
and peer monitoring costs.
9.2 Core–Periphery Structure
The skewed distribution of interbank links 
arises in part from a  core–periphery struc-
ture typical of interbank networks, with a 
small number of highly interconnected banks 
at the core and all others in the periphery. 
To formalize this idea, Craig and von Peter 
(2014) propose a precise, idealized definition 
of this structure. In their definition, every 
core bank lends to every other core bank; 
periphery banks do not lend to each other; 
and every core bank lends to and borrows 
from at least one periphery bank.18
In practice, the separation between the 
two tiers of banks is not that sharp: Craig and 
von Peter (2014) propose a measure of the 
distance from an ideal  core–periphery struc-
ture and use it to test the fit of the model to 
data. Using data on interbank lending among 
1,802 German banks, they identify a core of 
forty-five banks. Not surprisingly, the core 
banks are large banks that provide whole-
sale services, as well as traditional banking 
operations.
18 Capponi, Chen, and Yao (forthcoming) develop a 
different notion of concentration using the majorization 
partial ordering of payment vectors. In Castiglionesi and 
Navarro (2007), a  core–periphery structure arises endoge-
nously through a network formation game.
815Glasserman and Young: Contagion in Financial Networks
In’t Veld and Van Lelyveld (2014) apply 
the method of Craig and von Peter (2014) to 
the Dutch banking system and identify 10 to 
20 percent of banks as core. They also find 
that the average capital buffer at core banks 
is only about  one-half to  one-third of the 
average capital buffer for periphery banks, 
meaning that the most interconnected banks 
are the least well-capitalized. Anand et al. 
(2015) estimate  core–periphery structures 
across twenty-five markets as part of their 
comparison of methods for reconstructing 
networks from partial information, the topic 
of section 12.
9.3 Centrality and Node Depth
Centrality measures seek to identify the 
importance of a node in a network, and the 
networks literature has generated many such 
measures; chapter 7 of Newman (2010) pro-
vides an overview. A node’s degree is a simple 
measure of its importance; other measures 
try to capture more information about a 
node’s overall position in the network. In this 
section, we digress from our discussion of 
empirical work on networks to discuss cen-
trality measures and a connection with the 
idea of node depth used in section 8.
The eigenvector centrality vj of node j (also 
called Bonacich centrality after Bonacich 
1972) satisfies
(48)    λ  v j =  ∑ 
j=1
N
  v i  B ij , 
where B is the adjacency matrix and  λ is an 
eigenvalue of B. In this expression, a node 
has high centrality if it is connected to other 
nodes with high centrality. In the directed 
case, the expression says that the central-
ity of j depends on the centrality of nodes 
with edges pointing to j. Defining centrality 
through a right eigenvector instead flips the 
direction of influence and makes the cen-
trality of a node the weighted average of the 
centrality of the nodes to which it points.
Suppose that the network is irreducible 
in the sense that every node can be reached 
from every other node. In other words, for 
any pair of nodes i and j, there is some pos-
itive integer n for which the  ij-entry of Bn 
is strictly positive. In this case, the  Perron–
Frobenius theorem implies that B has an 
eigenvector with strictly positive entries, and 
this eigenvector is unique up to multiplica-
tion by a constant. The associated eigenvalue 
is real and positive and equals the spectral 
radius of B. This is the  eigenvalue–eigenvec-
tor pair used to define eigenvector centrality, 
often with the normalization that the central-
ity values sum to one.
If we divide each entry of B by the sum 
of entries in its row, we obtain the matrix Q 
with entries
(49)   q ij =  B ij / ∑ 
k=1
 
N
  B ik . 
This is a stochastic matrix describing the 
motion of a dollar moving randomly through 
the network, following each of the edges (i, j) 
out of a given node i with probability  q ij . The 
 Perron–Frobenius eigenvalue is 1, and the 
corresponding left eigenvector is the equi-
librium distribution for the Markov chain 
defined by Q. In this case, a node’s centrality 
is the fraction of time the dollar spends at 
that node as it moves randomly through the 
network19.
Centrality measures can also be defined 
from the liabilities matrix  [ 
_
 p ij ] and sug-
gest different interpretations depending on 
whether we take a left or right eigenvector
(50)  λ  v j =  ∑ 
i=1
N
  v i  
_
 p ij , λ  u j =  ∑ 
i=1
N
  
_
 p ij  u i . 
The left eigenvector assigns greater central-
ity to nodes that have claims on nodes with 
greater centrality. We may interpret this as 
19 Other, closely related measures of centrality (such as 
Katz centrality) are available when the irreducibility condi-
tion is not satisfied.
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funding centrality. The right eigenvector 
assigns greater centrality to nodes that have 
obligations to nodes with greater centrality, 
which suggests an interpretation as borrow-
ing centrality.20 The failure of a node with 
high borrowing centrality would result in 
defaults on large obligations and could set off 
a default cascade; in contrast, the failure of a 
node with high funding centrality could cre-
ate a liquidity shock at other nodes through 
the withdrawal of funding (see section 3.3).
The notion of node depth, which we intro-
duced in section 8, measures how much the 
losses at each defaulting node are amplified 
by network connections. This concept is dual 
to eigenvector centrality, as we now explain. 
As in section 8, let A denote the relative 
liabilities matrix for a set of nodes. The set 
could be the nodes in default or it could be 
the entire network; we simply assume that 
A is substochastic and that its largest eigen-
value is strictly less than 1. The associated 
node depth vector u for the network repre-
sented by A is given by
(51) u = [I + A + A2 + ⋯]1, 
where 1 is the vector of ones. If we interpret 
A as the transition matrix of an absorbing 
Markov chain, then  u i is the expected num-
ber of steps until absorption, starting from 
node i, and absorption corresponds to leav-
ing the network.21
The connection with centrality is easiest to 
see when the matrix AT is also substochastic 
and thus also defines an absorbing Markov 
chain. Consider a modified chain that restarts 
20 These ideas parallel upstream and downstream 
effects in network models of the macroeconomy; see 
Acemoglu, Akcigit, and Kerr (2015). A general treatment 
of centrality measures is given in Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and 
 Tahbaz-Salehi (2015b).
21 In more detail, the states of the Markov chain are the 
nodes of the network. When the chain is in state i, it leaves 
the network and gets absorbed upon its next transition with 
probability equal to 1 minus the sum of the entries in the 
ith row of A.
at a node picked uniformly at random follow-
ing absorption; between restarts, the motion 
of the chain is governed by AT.22 The ergodic 
distribution of the modified chain23 is pro-
portional to
(52)  1T[I + AT + (AT )2 + ⋯] = uT. 
In this sense, node depth with respect to A is 
related to eigenvector centrality with respect 
to AT.
Figure 12 illustrates the contrast between 
depth and centrality. Node C has only out-
side obligations, whereas all other nodes 
have only  in-network obligations. Node C 
is central because a dollar flowing through 
the network inevitably passes through C, but 
node C is shallow because a dollar leaving C 
immediately leaves the network. In contrast, 
the node at the start of each chain is periph-
eral and deep.
Staum, Feng, and Liu (2016) note a 
related Markov chain interpretation in their 
calculation of sensitivities in the  Eisenberg–
Noe (2001) model. Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, 
and  Tahbaz-Salehi (2015a) use the Markov 
chain analogy in defining a measure they 
call the “harmonic distance” between 
nodes in a network. Their measure counts 
the expected number of steps to reach one 
node from another node through a Markov 
chain defined by a matrix of relative liabili-
ties. In their setting, both the relative liabil-
ities matrix and its transpose are stochastic, 
so there is no notion of leaving the network.
22 This random restart mechanism is similar to the 
PageRank version of eigenvector centrality associated with 
the Google search algorithm, but PageRank uses a con-
stant probability of random restart from every node. See 
Newman (2010), section 7.4.
23  The modified chain has transition matrix P =  A T + 
[ I −  A T ]11T/n. This matrix satisfies  u T P =  u T even if  A T 
is not substochastic, but P may have some negative entries 
in that case.
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9.4 Empirical Network Measures and 
Measures of Stability
Network measures help describe com-
plex interbank networks. Whether they also 
help identify vulnerabilities is less clear. We 
review efforts to establish these connections.
Using data from a German credit regis-
ter, Craig, Koetter, and Krüger (2014) use 
bank centralities (measured through a vari-
ant of eigenvector centrality) as explanatory 
variables in regressions of individual bank 
risk and conclude that higher centrality 
predicts a lower probability of default. In 
their study of the Mexican banking system, 
 Martinez-Jaramillo et al. (2014) combine 
many different centrality measures into a 
composite measure using principal compo-
nents analysis. They contrast the structure 
of payment systems and interbank lending 
networks and find that centrality is not nec-
essarily determined by size. In their study 
of the Fed funds market, Bech and Atalay 
(2010) find that centrality measures are 
useful predictors of the interest rate banks 
charge each other on overnight loans, but 
they do not directly investigate implications 
for financial stability. Gabrieli (forthcoming) 
undertakes a similar analysis using European 
data. Battiston et al. (2012b) propose a mod-
ified centrality measure and apply it to data 
on emergency loans made by the Federal 
Reserve in  2008–10.
Puhr, Seliger, and Sigmund (2012) find 
Katz centrality (which is similar to eigen-
vector centrality with discounting of longer 
paths) to be a useful indicator in measur-
ing systemic risk. They start with data on 
the Austrian banking system and use this as 
input to a simulation of bank failure. Puhr 
et al. (2012) distinguish between contagious-
ness (a propensity to topple others) and vul-
nerability (a propensity to be toppled); this is 
similar to the contrast between left and right 
C
Figure 12. A Network in Which Node C is Central but Not Deep, and the Peripheral Nodes are Deep but 
Not Central
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eigenvectors discussed in section 9.3. They 
find that contagiousness increases with cen-
trality, but vulnerability depends on several 
network measures, including a clustering 
coefficient. However, it is unclear to what 
extent the importance of the centrality mea-
sures is a feature of the simulation model or 
of the original banking system.
Alter, Craig, and Raupach (2014) propose 
using a bank’s centrality in setting its  capital 
requirements. They combine lending data 
from the German credit register with a net-
work simulation in which random shocks to 
outside loans propagate through the network 
according to the  Rogers and Veraart (2013) 
extension of the  Eisenberg–Noe (2001) algo-
rithm. They compare alternative ways to real-
locate capital requirements from banks with 
low centrality to banks with high centrality 
using various measures of centrality. They 
find that eigenvector centrality based on 
the directed adjacency matrix is most effec-
tive in minimizing bankruptcy losses. Using 
centrality or almost any network measure in 
setting capital requirements poses a practical 
challenge because each bank’s requirement 
becomes dependent on the actions of other 
banks.
Clustering is a focus of the study in Boss 
et al. (2004) of the Austrian banking system. 
As explained there, the Austrian banks are 
organized in three tiers, and this is captured 
by the clustering methods used in the paper. 
Santos and Cont (2010) examine clustering 
and a related assortativity property in the 
Brazilian interbank network.
Overall, empirical work has not yet pro-
duced a compelling link between traditional 
network measures and financial stability. 
Empirical work is limited by the confidential-
ity of interbank transactions and the low fre-
quency of financial crises. But it may well be 
that standard network measures developed to 
highlight features in other applications are not 
well-suited to identifying vulnerabilities in the 
financial system, in which case it may be more 
productive to focus on new measures that 
reflect features specific to interbank networks.
10. The Impact of Connectivity
A recurring theme of the financial net-
works literature is the  double-edged nature 
of connectivity: interbank links allow risk 
sharing, but they also provide channels for 
the spread of shocks. We encountered this 
trade-off in our discussion of funding runs in 
section 4. Several studies have investigated 
this trade-off numerically or through simpli-
fied tractable models. 
Nier et al. (2007) simulate random net-
works in which each pair of banks has a fixed 
probability of connection through an inter-
bank loan, independent of all other pairs. 
Shocks to a bank’s assets spill over to other 
banks through cascading defaults.24 As Nier 
et al. (2007) increase the connection prob-
ability, they find a nonmonotonic (in fact, 
 M-shaped) effect on the total number of 
defaults. Increasing connectivity increases 
shock transmission and shock absorption, 
with the first effect dominating at low con-
nectivity and the second effect dominating at 
higher connectivity. Gai and Kapadia (2010) 
and Haldane and May (2011) draw simi-
lar conclusions but also observe that higher 
connectivity produces more severe, if less 
frequent, crises. Elliott, Golub, and Jackson 
(2014) make a similar point.
The effect of connectivity depends on 
what is held constant as connectivity varies. 
Several studies hold each bank’s total inter-
bank liabilities fixed as the number of links 
grows; this is the case in the nonmonotonic 
( M-shaped) finding of Nier et al. (2007). But 
connectivity can also be measured through 
the size of a bank’s interbank liabilities, 
rather than through the number of banks 
from which it borrows. This is arguably a 
24 They also consider an extension with fire sales, as in 
Cifuentes, Ferrucci, and Shin (2005).
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more important measure of vulnerability, as 
discussed in section 8. When they increase 
the proportion of interbank assets to total 
assets, Nier et al. (2007) find a monotonic 
effect on the number of defaults. The effect 
plateaus because they increase net worth at 
the same time.
Measuring connectivity through the prob-
ability of random connections is convenient, 
but it misses an important feature of the 
Allen and Gale (2000) model, where the 
structure, and not just the level of connectiv-
ity, matters. In particular, contagion in Allen 
and Gale (2000) is driven by the relationship 
between network structure and the correla-
tion in funding shocks across banks.
Gofman (2014) introduces important 
structural features to his model and takes 
a different approach to studying the conse-
quences of connectivity. Using a preferen-
tial attachment model of link formation, he 
calibrates features of his model to properties 
of the US Fed funds market, as reported in 
Bech and Atalay (2010), which leads to a 
 core–periphery structure. He holds fixed the 
average number of lending counterparties 
per bank and instead varies the maximum 
number of counterparties allowed per bank. 
In this sense, his comparison is orthogonal 
to most other comparisons of connectivity. 
Increasing the maximum number of coun-
terparties while holding fixed the average 
increases the concentration of the core—
an important dimension of connectivity 
in practice. He shocks the system with the 
failure of the most interconnected bank and 
finds a nonmonotonic relationship between 
the total number of failures and the cap on 
the number of counterparties. This pattern 
results from two competing effects: lowering 
the cap increases the size of the core while 
decreasing the exposures between core 
banks. Gofman (2011) also develops a mea-
sure of loss that increases with the length 
of chains through the network because of 
inefficiencies in  intermediation. His  overall 
conclusion is that a cap on the number of 
lending counterparties can decrease both 
stability and efficiency.
Relevant to this discussion is the Basel 
Committee’s (2014) standard for limiting 
large exposures between banks, which was 
developed specifically to mitigate  contagion 
risk. As discussed in section 7.1, the rule lim-
its the exposure of a bank to any other bank 
to no more than 25 percent of the lending 
bank’s capital. For exposures between global 
systemically important banks (roughly the 
core banks in the international  core–periph-
ery structure), the limit is 15 percent. Using 
the notation of figure 2, we may formulate 
this rule through constraints of the form
(53)   
_
 p ij / w i ≤ 15% or 25%.
In particular, this limits the size of interbank 
exposures, but not the number of exposures. 
This constraint applies on the asset side. A 
recent US rule (Federal Reserve 2015) sets 
higher capital requirements for banks with 
high levels of “wholesale” funding. The rule 
is complex, but may be roughly approxi-
mated in a network model through a con-
straint of the form
(54)   w i ≥ k  β i  p ̅ i , 
for some multiplier k. In other words, a 
higher level of  in-network (wholesale) fund-
ing requires a higher level of capital. These 
two rules substantially limit the interconnect-
edness of the network. But, appropriately, 
they do so by limiting exposure magnitudes, 
not the  in-degree or  out-degree allowed at 
a node.
Some of the main results in Acemoglu, 
Ozdaglar, and  Tahbaz-Salehi (2015a) exam-
ine the effect of connectivity holding the net-
work topology fixed and instead varying the 
size of an initial shock. They show that a ring 
network always produces the greatest num-
ber of defaults because, as in section 4.1, it 
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concentrates the spillover from one node to 
another. A completely connected network 
produces the least number of defaults when 
shocks are small, and the greatest number of 
defaults when shocks are large.
We illustrate the simplest version of 
this result through figure 13. All nodes are 
ex ante identical. Each has c in outside assets 
and b in outside liabilities; each has an iden-
tical payment obligation of  
_
 p to (and from) 
every other bank. Outside liabilities are 
senior to interbank liabilities. Payments are 
determined through a  fixed-point argument 
similar to Eisenberg and Noe (2001).
Node 1 suffers a shock X to its outside asset. 
All other nodes are identical, so we may focus 
on node 2. By symmetry, banks 2, … , n make 
identical payments to each other regardless 
of the shock, so those  payments cancel each 
other. Banks 2, … , n will either all fail or all 
survive.
The interesting case has node 1 default, 
which requires  c − X < b . Whatever 
payment, p, node 1 receives from each 
of the other nodes it will be able to 
return  (c − X − b + (n − 1) p)/(n − 1) to 
each node after paying its senior outside obli-
gations (as shown in the figure), provided 
this quantity is positive; otherwise, it returns 
zero. Now consider node 2’s ability to pay. 
Node 2 defaults when its assets are worth 
less than its liabilities; that is , 
(55)   c +  p ̅ +  c − X − b ________n − 1 < b +  p ̅, 
which is equivalent to  X > n(c − b) . This is 
the threshold proved in Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, 
and  Tahbaz-Salehi (2015a) for what they call a 
phase transition. Notice, however, that  c − b 
is each node’s net worth, so  n(c − b) is the 
total net worth of the banking system. For 
 
1
2 n…
c  − X
n − 1
c − X − b
b
b
c
p
p +
Figure 13. A Symmetric Completely Connected Network
Note: Connections between nodes 2, … , n are not shown.
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any asset shock short of that high level, the 
fully connected network produces the small-
est number of defaults.
Interestingly, Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and 
 Tahbaz-Salehi (2015a) show that there can 
be other configurations under which some 
nodes survive even a catastrophic shock of 
this size. The alternative configurations par-
tition the network into loosely connected 
subsets, creating a firewall that limits the 
spread of losses but without the complete 
separation of the containment example in 
Allen and Gale (2000). Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, 
and  Tahbaz-Salehi (2015a) give an elegant 
characterization of the degree of separation 
through a bottleneck parameter.
The spread of losses is contained by the 
sizes of interbank liabilities—a bank can-
not fail to pay more than 100 percent of its 
obligations. Indeed, in figure 13, for node 1 
to impose the indicated loss on each of the 
other nodes requires
(56)   p ̅ >  c − X − b ________n − 1 . 
Thus even the catastrophic shock 
 X ≥ c(n − b) will not bring down the  network 
unless node 1’s obligation to each other bank 
exceeds its net worth  c − b = w . This would 
violate the Basel large exposure limit dis-
cussed above; the large exposure limit is thus 
consistent with the containment strategy 
suggested by a network perspective.
11. Common Exposure Networks 
and Fire Sales
Our primary focus has been on networks 
defined by payment obligations from bor-
rowers to lenders, but networks can also be 
used to model the situation where financial 
institutions have overlapping exposures to 
different asset classes. In section 5.5, we dis-
cussed the simple case where they all hold 
the same illiquid asset and contagion results 
when some of them are forced to sell to meet 
liquidity requirements. 
A similar dynamic can arise when institu-
tions hold multiple illiquid assets and there 
is overlap in their exposures. Consider the 
bipartite graph of exposures in figure 14. A 
shock to Asset 1 (Florida real estate, say) cre-
ates a cash shortfall for Firm 1 (a bank or a 
hedge fund), forcing it to sell its holdings in 
 
 
Firm
1
Asset 1
Asset 2
Asset k
Firm
2
Firm
3
Figure 14. A Bipartitle Network of Firms and Assets
Note: Edges indicate ownership of assets by firms.
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Asset 2 (emerging market bonds, say). The 
forced sale could result from a leverage con-
straint in the case of a hedge fund or a capital 
requirement in the case of a bank. If the sell-
off is large enough to drive down the price 
of Asset 2, it imposes losses on Firm 2 and 
Firm N. Thus, these firms can suffer indirect 
effects from the initial shock to Asset 1, even 
though they have no direct exposure to that 
asset.
The Office of Financial Research (2013, 
p. 15), uses this type of network representa-
tion to illustrate the overlap—and potential 
spillover—in holdings among the ten larg-
est US prime money market funds. Caccioli 
et al. (2014) propose a branching process 
model of contagion through this type of com-
mon exposure network.
Chen, Iyengar, and Moallemi (forthcom-
ing) develop a model of this type in which 
investment firms optimize their portfolio 
holdings and then optimally rebalance in 
response to an asset shock; this endoge-
nizes the contagion effect. They distinguish 
low leverage and high leverage regimes and 
identify a stark contrast between the two: 
in the first case, network amplification of 
shocks is minimized when all firms hold an 
identical mix of assets, and in the second case 
it is minimized by splitting the banks into 
two groups with nonoverlapping exposures. 
These effects do not depend on payment 
obligations between banks.
As discussed in Chen, Iyengar, and 
Moallemi (forthcoming), their results bear on 
a related question of the trade-off between 
diversification and diversity: investment 
diversification reduces risk for each firm, but 
when all firms hold similar diversified posi-
tions, the system as a whole may be more vul-
nerable. Models of this phenomenon include 
Acharya (2009); Allen, Babus, and Carletti 
(2012); Battiston et al. (2012a); Bimpikis and 
 Tahbaz-Salehi (2012); Cabrales, Gottardi, 
and  Vega-Redondo (2013); Ibragimov, Jaffee, 
and Walden (2011); and Wagner (2011).
12. Assessing Systemic Risk with Limited 
Network Information
Network models of the financial system 
usually assume complete information about 
interbank exposures. In practice, this level 
of detail is never available to the public or 
to the banks themselves, and even regula-
tors rarely have a comprehensive view of all 
payment obligations between financial insti-
tutions—obligations that in any case are con-
stantly changing.25 In this section, we discuss 
various approaches to the problem of limited 
network information.
12.1 Networks Defined Through 
 Comovements
One way to get around the problem of 
limited information on interbank links is to 
define a network through comovements in 
stock prices. This approach taps an abun-
dance of data to uncover potential links 
between firms, with the caveat that the links 
may be difficult to interpret and need not 
correspond to a structural network defined 
through specific contracts or payments.
Billio et al. (2012) construct networks of 
financial institutions through Granger cau-
sality relationships in stock returns. In more 
detail, they estimate models of stock returns, 
R, of the form
(57)  R t+1 i =  a i  R t i +  b ij  R t j +  e t+1 i 
  R t+1 
j =  a  j  R  t j +  b  ji  R  t i +  e t+1 j , 
25 The most detailed analyses of financial networks 
have used confidential data on  short-term (mostly over-
night) lending—for example, Soramäki et al. (2007); Bech 
and Atalay (2010); Afonso, Kovner, and Schoar (2011); 
Gabrieli and Georg (2014); and Blasques, Bräuning, and 
van Lelyveld (2015). Even these studies have relied on 
incomplete data: they use funds transfers through central-
ized payment systems to infer payment obligations. This is 
often done through the Furfine (1999) algorithm, which 
interprets nearly offsetting payments between banks as a 
loan and a repayment with interest.
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where i and j index financial firms and t 
indexes time. The error terms are assumed 
uncorrelated across firms and across times. 
A nonzero value of bij indicates Granger cau-
sality from firm j to firm i; it measures the 
strength of the spillover from a shock to j in 
one period to a shock to i in the next period. 
Including firm i’s own lagged stock return 
in the regression helps ensure that bij cap-
tures a genuine spillover effect, not simply 
the impact of a common shock in the prior 
period.
Billio et al. (2011) use the statistically sig-
nificant bij to construct directed networks 
between financial firms and to define sev-
eral associated measures of connectivity. 
They compare estimates from different 
time periods and find that connectivity 
increases in advance of financial crises, sug-
gesting the possibility of an early warning 
signal.
Bonaldi, Hortaçsu, and Kastl (2015) esti-
mate networks of banks based on changes 
in funding costs: a directed edge from one 
bank to another indicates that an increase 
in the funding cost in one bank is associ-
ated with an increase in the funding cost 
of the other bank in the next period. Their 
analysis is based on confidential bids in 
the European Central Bank’s  short-term 
refinancing auctions. They find that using 
public data through the method of Billio 
et al. (2011) leads to lower estimates of 
interconnectedness between banks. They 
attribute the difference to market effi-
ciency—in an informationally efficient 
market, none of the bij in (57) should 
be significant.
Diebold and Yilmaz (2014) estimate net-
works from market data using variance 
decompositions for the forecast errors in 
multivariate time series.  Off-diagonal entries 
in the variance decomposition reflect the 
influence of shocks to one variable on the 
forecast errors in another variable, and these 
 cross-variable influences can be used to 
construct directed networks. In their main 
application, Diebold and Yilmaz (2014) 
apply their method to stock return volatil-
ities, rather than the returns themselves. 
They find high connectivity between Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac and among some of 
the largest commercial banks. In  2007–08, 
they find spikes in net connectedness from 
AIG, Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and 
Wachovia at critical dates.
These methods exploit the abundance of 
market data to identify links between institu-
tions. In contrast, network models based on 
payment obligations are constrained by the 
confidentiality and relatively low frequency 
of the data they require. Network measures 
based on correlations may be able to detect 
important patterns of comovements in mar-
ket data, but they are generally unable to 
identify the underlying mechanism generat-
ing those comovements.
12.2 Imputing Missing Data
An alternative approach, which goes back 
to some of the earliest research on interbank 
networks, imputes values for unavailable 
information to complete the specification of 
the network. Let   
_
 p ij denote the (unknown) 
liability of bank i to bank j, and, as before, 
think of the   
_
 p ij as entries of an n × n 
matrix. Suppose we know only the row sums 
ri, i = 1, … , n, and the column sums cj, 
j = 1, … , n, of this matrix: ri represents 
bank i’s total obligations to other banks, 
and cj represents bank j’s total claims on 
other banks.
This was the situation faced by Sheldon 
and Maurer (1998) in their analysis of the 
Swiss interbank network. Of the infinitely 
many sets of interbank liabilities   
_
 p ij consis-
tent with the marginal assets cj and liabilities 
ri, they proposed using the values from a 
maximum entropy solution, interpreting this 
as the solution that minimizes the amount 
of external information imposed on the 
solution.
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In more detail, they proposed fixing the 
interbank liabilities by solving the con-
strained convex optimization problem
(58)   min { p ̅ij }  ∑ 
i, j
 
 
  
_
 p ij  ln  p ̅ ij 
 subject to   ∑ 
j
 
 
 
_
 p ij =  r i , i = 1,  .  .  . , n
  ∑ 
i
 
 
 
_
 p ij =  c j ,   j = 1,  .  .  . , n ,
with the convention that 0 ∙ ln 0 = 0. Without 
loss of generality, we may normalize the total 
amount of lending (the sum over all   
_
 p ij ) to 1, 
which makes  ∑ i    r i =  ∑ j    c j = 1 . The opti-
mal solution is then
(59)   p ̅ ij =  r i  c j . 
The simplicity of this solution is appealing, 
but other features make it implausible. As 
noted by Sheldon and Maurer (1998), it sug-
gests stochastic independence across banks 
in their decisions to borrow and lend to other 
banks. It also yields nonzero diagonal entries, 
although banks cannot meaningfully lend to 
themselves.
Upper and Worms (2004) address the sec-
ond of these concerns. They change the opti-
mization objective to
(60)   min { p ̅ ij }  ∑ 
i, j
 
 
  
_
 p ij ln ( p ̅ ij / x ij ) , 
where  x ij =  r i  c j for  i ≠ j and  x ii = 0 . This 
modification ensures that the optimal solu-
tion will have zero diagonal entries (taking 
ln(0/0) = 0). It produces the solution with 
this property that is closest to the  Sheldon–
Maurer solution in the sense of relative 
entropy, and it is computationally convenient.
This type of approach has been widely 
used in studies of national banking networks, 
including Degryse and Nguyen (2007) and 
Wells (2004). Elsinger, Lehar, and Summer 
(2006) have data on most, but not all, inter-
bank liabilities in the Austrian banking sys-
tem; they use entropy optimization to fill in 
the missing values. Upper (2011) compares 
the results of these and other studies.
The maximum entropy and minimum rela-
tive entropy methods produce interbank lia-
bilities that are as uniform as possible, given 
other constraints imposed on the problem. 
In particular, without additional constraints 
they produce fully connected networks. 
These features make these solutions unre-
alistic, given the prevalence of power law 
degree distributions and  core–periphery 
structure reviewed in section 9.1.
Mistrulli (2011) compares actual interbank 
exposures in the Italian banking system with 
exposures imputed using maximum entropy 
and finds, indeed, that the imputed networks 
are too dense, given the presence of large, 
core banks in the Italian system. Through 
simulation experiments, he concludes that 
maximum entropy networks understate the 
severity of contagion unless the assumed 
loss given default is quite high. This is to 
be expected—spreading liabilities too uni-
formly dilutes the effect of a shock.
Van Lelyveld and Liedorp (2006) address 
these shortcomings using additional infor-
mation. For their analysis of the Dutch 
banking system, they have detailed bilateral 
information reported by banks on their larg-
est exposures. For all other interbank expo-
sures, they have only partial (row sum and 
column sum) information. They hypothe-
size that the network of large exposures is 
representative of the network of all expo-
sures and can therefore be used as a guide 
to filling in missing data. They select the 
matrix of interbank assets that is closest to 
the matrix of large exposures, in the sense 
of relative entropy, subject to the marginal 
constraints.
An alternative to imputing a fixed set of 
values for interbank liabilities is to gener-
ate random networks consistent with partial 
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network information and then to analyze 
contagion across a distribution of networks. 
Examples include Anand, Craig, and von 
Peter (2014); Drehmann and Tarashev 
(2013); Gandy and Veraart (forthcoming); 
Halaj and Kok (2013); and Sachs (2014). 
These types of methods offer the potential 
for a richer analysis consistent with limited 
partial information. Their sampling methods 
are somewhat heuristic and their properties 
therefore not yet well understood. The com-
parison of methods in Anand et al. (2015) is 
an important step in understanding which 
methods for network reconstruction work 
well with which types of networks. 
12.3 Bounds Based on Partial Information
As discussed in section 8, Glasserman 
and Young (2015) address the problem of 
incomplete information by using  node-level 
data to bound the amount of loss amplifica-
tion due to the (unknown) network. Their 
analysis assumes four pieces of informa-
tion about each node: its total claims inside 
and outside the network, and its total lia-
bilities inside and outside the network. As 
discussed in Glasserman and Young (2015) 
and Allahrakha, Glasserman, and Young 
(2015), this information is well approxi-
mated through public sources. Their analysis 
does not assume knowledge of the network 
topology and it does not assume information 
about claims and obligations between pairs 
of nodes.
12.4  Within-Network Uncertainty
In his discussion of challenges facing 
the measurement of systemic risk, Hansen 
(2012) highlights the importance of uncer-
tainty and distinguishes two types: uncer-
tainty on the part of modelers observing the 
financial system, and uncertainty on the part 
of participants within the financial system. 
The discussion in this section has focused on 
the first issue; we now touch on models of 
the second.
Uncertainty amplifies contagion in the 
interbank network model of Caballero and 
Simsek (2013). They consider a simple 
ring network in which each bank lends to 
exactly one other bank; the banks also hold 
risky outside assets and cash. One bank is 
hit with an unexpected payment obligation, 
and all banks decide whether to sell their 
risky assets or use their cash to buy more 
risky assets. The unexpected shock causes 
a domino effect of failures at some banks 
and a flight to quality at banks that liqui-
date their risky assets. Caballero and Simsek 
(2013) contrast two settings: one in which all 
banks have full information about the net-
work, and one in which banks do not know 
their distance from the bank that suffers the 
initial shock. In the uncertain case, banks 
choose their actions to optimize against the 
 worst-case configuration. With a sufficiently 
large shock, uncertainty about the network 
leads to more bank failures, a universal flight 
to quality, and a fire sale price for the risky 
asset. Alvarez and Barlevy (2014) extend the 
model and investigate when mandatory dis-
closure of which banks have suffered losses 
is welfare-improving.
Whereas the network topology is exog-
enous in Caballero and Simsek (2013), 
Pritsker’s (2013) model seeks to explain 
the structure of the interbank lending mar-
ket through uncertainty aversion. The Fed 
funds market has a tiered structure in which 
smaller banks are net lenders to larger banks, 
and large banks lend to each other. The 
market features both  relationship-based 
lending and, in the top tier, anonymously 
brokered lending. In Pritsker’s (2013) 
model, lending banks are uncertain about 
the asset quality (hence creditworthiness) 
of borrowing banks and demand an uncer-
tainty premium. Uncertainty has a greater 
effect on the  worst-case default probability 
for small banks, and this leads to a tiered 
structure in equilibrium. Pritsker (2013) 
also discusses the role of the government in 
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improving the functioning of the interbank 
market by producing information to reduce 
uncertainty.
Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008) develop 
a model in which “information contagion” 
contributes to systemic risk. The failure of 
one bank leads depositors to update their 
beliefs about a surviving bank, leading them 
to demand a higher interest rate or withdraw 
their deposits. Anticipating this response, 
banks choose correlated investments so that 
they are more likely to fail together than sepa-
rately. A line of research on  over-the-counter 
markets studies the spread of information in 
trading networks; see Duffie (2012), Duffie, 
Malamud, and Manso (2009), and Gofman 
(2014).
Outside the network setting, Dang et al. 
(2014) argue that opacity is intrinsic to the 
function of banks as providers of safe assets 
like deposits. In their framework, a finan-
cial crisis is associated with safe, informa-
tion-insensitive assets becoming information 
sensitive, undermining their function as 
 money-like securities. In Caballero and 
Krishnamurthy (2008), a financial crisis 
unfolds as a shock to one asset amplifies 
uncertainty about other assets, prompting 
market participants to hoard liquidity. 
13. Conclusion and Open Problems
The focus of this article has been on what 
the financial networks literature has to say 
about the relationship between intercon-
nectedness and financial stability. Do more 
interbank connections promote stability 
through risk sharing, or do they lead to 
greater fragility by creating channels for con-
tagion? One of the key lessons of the litera-
ture is that this question cannot be answered 
without considering other factors that con-
tribute to contagion, including leverage lev-
els and heterogeneity in size. As we have 
seen, the interaction between these factors 
and the network topology is quite complex 
and not fully understood even at a theo-
retical level. From a practical standpoint, 
one would like to know what the  literature 
teaches us about the contagiousness of par-
ticular institutions. How can one identify 
the institutions that are most likely to gener-
ate contagion and which institutions are the 
most vulnerable? Various concepts from the 
social-networks literature been proposed 
to tackle this problem. Nevertheless, more 
theoretical and empirical research needs 
to be done before we can be confident that 
these measures are valid predictors of finan-
cial contagion in practice. 
Another issue that needs more systematic 
study is how to measure the “size” of a sys-
temic event. Simply counting the number of 
bank failures is clearly not sufficient. A more 
comprehensive measure is the total loss in 
value of financial and nonfinancial assets. Of 
course, from a policy standpoint, one would 
like to be able to quantify the loss in eco-
nomic welfare that is associated with a given 
loss in asset values. Although there has been 
some work on this question, much remains 
to be done—both empirically and theoreti-
cally—to identify the relationship between 
financial losses, the supply of credit, and 
their impact on the real economy. 
As we mentioned at the outset, the focus 
of this article has been on the dynamics of 
contagion in the financial system when the 
network of obligations is given. There is also 
a growing literature on the dynamics of link 
formation (see among others Babus 2007; 
Castiglionesi and Navarro 2007; Georg 2013; 
Erol and Vohra 2014; Farboodi 2014; In ‘t 
Veld, van der Leij, and Hommes 2014; and 
Vuillemey and Breton 2014). The conven-
tional view is that institutions establish links 
with one another as a way of diversifying 
risk and facilitating intermediation. While 
this is certainly true, we would argue that a 
realistic model of network formation must 
include other factors. In particular, one must 
acknowledge that links between financial 
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institutions are often created in a decentral-
ized fashion within particular lines of busi-
ness, such as commercial lending, foreign 
exchange, derivatives trading, repo desks, 
and the like. Building realistic models of the 
resulting dynamics will require a high degree 
of institutional knowledge and a clear under-
standing of the incentives faced by the indi-
viduals who are forming (and severing) these 
links. We believe that this is one of the most 
important challenges for future research in 
this area. 
Another challenge is to develop a more 
comprehensive and integrated account of 
the various mechanisms that cause conta-
gion within the financial system. The most 
 often-studied mechanism is the transmis-
sion of defaults through payment shortfalls, 
as in the  Eisenberg–Noe model and its 
extensions. A quite different transmission 
mechanism is the contraction in  short-term 
funding that can occur when institutions 
pull funding in response to liquidity shocks. 
To date, there has been relatively little 
research on how institutions (and individ-
ual traders within these institutions) actu-
ally behave when determining how to ration 
 short-term funding in times of financial 
stress. 
Other mechanisms for contagion can 
operate without network linkages while rein-
forcing network effects. For example, the 
downward spiral in asset prices that results 
from the dumping of illiquid assets (fire 
sales) in response to liquidity shocks can 
spread losses through markets, amplifying a 
cascade of defaults. Yet another mechanism 
is “information contagion.” This is triggered 
by changes in market perceptions about the 
creditworthiness of particular institutions 
and the value of their assets, which can feed 
through the system and create a general cri-
sis of confidence. More empirical research 
needs to be done to disentangle these vari-
ous mechanisms and to estimate their rela-
tive magnitudes. 
Much of the literature on financial net-
work models presupposes complete infor-
mation about the network. We have argued 
that network opacity is a  first-order concern 
for agents within the network, for  regulators 
monitoring the network, and therefore for 
researchers developing models. More work 
is needed on inference from partial obser-
vations of network data and on understand-
ing how opacity itself may contribute to 
contagion.
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